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Abstract This study investigates to what extent post-disaster reconstruction and 
rehabilitation might impact or re-shape political systems employing a human security 
approach. The increased exposure of human societies to numerous disasters with tre-
mendous human and material losses has proved the insufficiency of the techno-centric 
approach. Furthermore, the causes and impact of disasters are grounded in socio-poli-
tics and the violation of human security. The human security approach is considered 
here to be an alternative to the techno-centric approach, which purely views disaster 
vulnerability as physical and relies on expert knowledge and top-down planning favored 
by many government officials. To develop this human security approach an analytical 
framework for human security was composed with the aim of benefiting disaster stud-
ies. The framework was examined through a case study of the 2003 Bam earthquake 
in Iran, which provided empirical detail. The salient findings are that reconstruction 
failed, non-state actors were mobilized, and a renegotiation of human security and 
rights claims was established, although they were repressed by the government. Also, 
it is shown that people showed capacity to cope with such an event on the base of their 
own local knowledge and heritage. In conclusion, it was seen that there was potential 
for political change both in the social contract and in renegotiation over the issue of 
human security. It is also suggested that the real participation and empowerment of 
local people can be recognized through an evaluation of their capacities as well as their 
vulnerability. The reduction of disaster vulnerability depends on people’s awareness 
and governance of societies that can question government decision-making and plan-
ning and can help them to stress their claims to certain right as well as safeguard their 
human security.
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1. Introduction
It is apparent that human and material losses from natural disasters have increased decade 
by decade since the second half of the twentieth century. Disasters, such as earthquakes, tsu-
namis, typhoons and hurricanes lead to vastly different types of tragedies among human societ-
ies. With the increase in the disasters of all kinds throughout the twentieth century until the 
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present, a theoretical understanding and conceptualization of disasters has also undergone a 
corresponding change due to the inefficiencies in a comprehensive response to a disastrous sit-
uation using a technocratic paradigm, which over the second half of the last century was and 
still is the dominant paradigm within the UN and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank 
(Varley, 1994). In this approach, disasters are defined as the occurrence of natural or human-
made forces and are represented as departures from normality (Bankoff, 2004). The main pur-
pose of this approach is the transformation from traditional subsistence knowledge, defined as 
‘backward’, to monitoring techniques, scientific theory and engineering structures, which are 
defined as ‘modern’ (see e.g. White, 1974 ; White and Haas, 1975 ; Burton et al., 1978- 
updated 1993). The core assumptions of the technocratic approach lie in the possibility of 
rapid recovery and construction based on ‘command and control model’ planning with purely 
technical measures putting stress on formulating and advocating standard solutions (Bolt et al., 
1977 ; Bryant, 1991). The process within which this takes place is top-down, relying on 
‘expert knowledge’ and advanced technology carried out by bureaucrats and central institutions 
(see also Hewitt, 1983, 1995 ; Smith and Petley, 2009).
In the 1970s, some social scientists and anthropologists, in contrast to the technocratic 
research of the hazard-based paradigm, began to question the reading of disasters as purely nat-
ural phenomena because of continuous failures in reducing disaster losses, especially in devel-
oping countries (Bankoff, 2004 ; Smith and Petley, 2009). This new field of research in social 
science was pioneered by scholars of risk studies, such as Luhmann (1995), with lexis for ana-
lyzing risk and danger as part of social process by which a differentiated social system attempts 
to cope with uncertain situations caused by disruption. This view stressed a social response 
to various disasters while acknowledging the importance of local contexts for the first time and 
it defined disaster as an explosion of social risks and vulnerabilities (Hewitt, 1997). In sum, 
they argue that on the one hand, disasters effect on people and their environment and on the 
other hand, human activities can increase disaster’s impact (Hewitt, 1983 ; Hewitt, 1997 ; 
Tobin and Montz, 1997 ; Alexander, 2000). This view has been helpful in refining some key 
concepts, such as poverty and vulnerability, and human vulnerability analyzing and mapping 
have now become important concepts for understanding the scale of a disaster (Blaikie et al., 
1994 ; Bankoff, 2004 ; Wisner et al., 2004 ; Smith and Petley, 2009).
Following the slow progress in disaster reduction and more severe damages and losses of 
natural disasters, especially in developing countries, some social practitioners with experience 
in developing countries tried to define the causes of disasters in development practice and 
therefore discover how the impact of a disaster can be reduced in a sustainable way in the 
future, especially for the poorest people in a rapidly changing world. With this view, UNDP-
DHA (1994) and Anderson & Woodrow (1998) argue that the effects of development can 
increase or reduce vulnerability to disaster risk and they call for an analytical framework, based 
on capacities and vulnerabilities, which defines development as the process by which vulnera-
bility is reduced and local capacities increased. By contrast, Lewis (1999) rejects this view 
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stating that the argument that development leads to a reduction of vulnerability is not war-
ranted. He posits that this is mainly because people take development as being synonymous 
with economic growth and identify vulnerability as a dependent variable that can be affected 
negatively or positively by development (UNDP-DHA, 1994). Hewitt adds that ‘[i]f there 
could be such a thing as sustainable development, disasters would represent a major threat to 
it, or a sign of its failure’ (1995 : 155). These notions of development make the crucial point 
that what is conceived as development by some might result in under-development for others. 
Meanwhile, concerning today’s explanation of climate change, ecologists call for a credible 
approach because future disasters are likely to be larger in scale than in the past and there will 
be increasingly complex human societies and concentrations of people in urban areas (Mileti 
and Myers, 1997 ; Rubin, 1998 ; Warner et al., 2002). For instance, widespread devastation is 
arising not only in the developing countries but also during this period in the richest megacities 
of the world (like the Kobe earthquake 1995 in Japan, Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, USA 
in 2005 (Smith and Petley, 2009), and the Tohoku region’s earthquake and tsunami in 2011 in 
Japan). This view re-emphasizes the mutual interactions between nature and society, whereby 
disasters emerge when there is a lack of ‘mutuality’, a measure of both how well a society is 
adapted to the environment and how well that environment fares at the hands of human activity 
(Bankoff, 2001 ; Oliver-Smith, 1999).
The primary linkage of human security in disaster studies might be traced back to litera-
ture on environmental and climate change (Ullman, 1983 ; Myers, 1986 ; Brown, 1986 ; 
Mathews, 1989). There, human insecurity (limited access to rights and basic needs) increases 
the scope and impact of vulnerability to environmental change and disaster and can influence 
livelihoods and the capacity to cope with future threats (Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007 ; cited in 
Pelling and Dill, 2010). This necessitated a broadening of the concept of security beyond state 
security against contain non-military threats and revisit vulnerability with a concern for human 
security (Birkmann and Wisner, 2005). This occurred alongside big debates within academia 
and among policymakers after the Cold War. These efforts resulted in conceptualizing envi-
ronmental security with a special emphasis on conceptual and empirical clarity. Views were 
mostly divided into two ranges. The first line was best known from studies from the Peace 
and Conflict Studies Programme at the University of Toronto (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994 ; 
Homer-Dixon et al., 1993). Under the influence of a neo-Malthusian approach, this group 
asked whether and how scarcities of vital, non-renewable and renewable materials caused by 
environmental change, population growth, technology and the unequal social distribution of 
resources might produce international conflict and risk (see e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994 ; 
Cocklin, 2002 ; Pelling and Dill, 2010). Another group, such as Ullman (1983), emphasizes 
global environmental threats and extends the security concept to include other threats to 
human beings, like natural disasters, namely earthquakes.
Besides initiating several programs, this group tried to find out how human security can be 
used to encounter environmental changes in the conditions of human livelihoods. The Inter-
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national Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP) set up a 
project on environment and security, the Global Environmental Change and Human Security 
project (GECHS). The GECHS project of the IHDP concentrates on human security and 
investigates whether it can raise social capacity with respect to global change (Cocklin, 2002). 
Longergan (1999) itemizes the GECHS’s notion of human security as centered on people’s 
active engagement in response to threats and reducing vulnerabilities (Lonergan, 1999). 
According to Lonergan, human security is retained where people have, one, the choice to 
reduce or cope with threats to their human, environmental, and social rights ; two, the capabil-
ity and freedom to play these choices ; and, three, the opportunity to actively participate in 
achieving these choices (Lonergan, 1999). Lonergan (1999) posits three post-structuralist 
premises for strengthening the definition. The first considers that human perceptions and the 
use of the environment are based on economic, social and political constructions. The second 
sees that world poverty and equity must be encompassed, and the third emphasizes the contri-
bution of the knowledge base at the local level rather than at the level of the nation-state in 
dealing with both environmental and security concerns (Lonergan, 1999 ; cited in Cocklin, 
2002).
Another area of focus on disaster and human security is placed by studies on vulnerability. 
The contribution of vulnerability to human security was brought about by the UN University 
Institute for Environment and Human Security (Brauch, 2005 ; Birkmann and Wisner, 2005 ; 
Villagran, 2006 ; Warner, 2007). According to Birkmann (2006), applying human security 
approaches in vulnerability analysis includes institutions as key elements in investigating the 
shape of human exposure, susceptibility and coping capacity (Birkmann, 2006). As a narrative 
it has one leg in development and the other in disaster. The advocates of vulnerability insist 
that vulnerability ‘is not the same as poverty, marginalization, or other conceptualizations that 
identify sections of the population who are deemed to be disadvantaged, at risk, or in other 
ways in need’ (Cannon et al., 2003 : 4 ; see also Wisner et al., 2004) but it is supposedly a way 
of conceptualizing what may happen to an identifiable population under conditions of particular 
risks and hazards’ (Cannon et al., 2003 : 4).
Recently, the special attention to the topic of human security and disaster was raised due 
to the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake on 11 March, 2011. This can be identified from a num-
ber of websites and symposia about human security and natural disasters which were held 
under the cooperation of Japanese universities, the Japan Foundation and the UN University, for 
instance, “Human Security-Towards New Development”1), a joint symposium of the UN Uni-
versity Institute for Sustainability and Peace (UNU-ISP) and the Japan Foundation for UNU 
(jfUNU) (Dec. 2010). One of the main topics of the symposium was ‘natural disasters and the 
responsibility to protect’. The main discussion however, focused on the evolving role of the 
military as a security guarantee to rescue and protect people in natural disasters, such as the 
example of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Other examples are “Natural Disasters and Human 
Security”, which was related to an online survey on the UNU website2), “Human Security 
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Approaches for Disaster Recovery and Resilience” (Jimba et al., 2011) by the International 
Medical Community, mainly focused on how people in the 2011 earthquake and tsunami coped 
with the disaster. In particular, the role of young people and education was highlighted. Last 
but not the least is the “Joint Symposium on Human Security in Disasters ; Tohoku University 
and UNU Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS)”, which was held in Feb-
ruary 2012. Its major topics were around natural hazards safety, vulnerability assessment and 
risk management and a series of presentations by young researchers about the Great Eastern 
Japan Earthquake in 2011 with a perspective on human security. The common ground of all 
these symposia and articles was the aim to ‘best understand and respond to threats that the 
natural disasters pose to human safety and wellbeing. One could see few systematic and theo-
retical analyses of disaster and human security from these attempts.
On 26th December 2003, at 05 : 27 am (local time), the region of Bam in southeast Iran 
was struck by an earthquake registering 6.6 on the Richter scale, which killed 35,000 people. 
Iran is located on the active Alpine-Himalayan fault. More than 180,000 people have been 
killed due to earthquakes in Iran over the last 90 years (National Report on Disaster Reduction, 
2005). The last four decades have seen three other disastrous earthquakes : the first was in 
Boeen Zahra in 1961, with 10,000 deaths, the second happened in Tabas in 1978, with 19,600 
human losses, that in Manjil was the third, with 35,000 deaths in 1990. Earthquakes are a 
serious threat to human security. These events produced a realization of the political impact 
of natural disasters in the early 1980s. Disaster politics analysis was seen as ‘the interaction 
of social political actors and framing institutions in preparing for and responding to extreme nat-
ural events, and suggests that disaster events and their management are part of unfolding politi-
cal histories’ (Pelling and Dill, 2010 : 21).
Therefore, the present research tries to investigate the following questions such as to 
what extent can natural disasters, such as earthquakes, trigger a renegotiation of human secu-
rity around a new social contract. In other words, how much human insecurity is related to 
the existing power relations? In particular, what was the outcome of Iranian government plan-
ning in the distribution of power—e.g. centralizing or decentralizing—and in the mitigation of 
disasters? Finally, what is the potential capacity of the people, and how do they put pressure 
on the government and renegotiate their demands or reduce vulnerability against earthquakes 
in Bam, Iran? The assumptions are that there is a corresponding relationship between disas-
ter vulnerability and the nature of existing power relations in multiple levels (from individuals 
to international) and various time phasing (from pre-disaster to post-disaster). Also, people’s 
perceptions and capacities with regard to a disaster are different from those who intervene in 
the situation, such as governments or international and national NGOs. Then, besides their 
vulnerability to disasters, people have historically developed coping strategies to mitigate or at 
least reduce the impact of a natural disaster through long-term efforts.
The aim of this research is to fill the gap in the theory of human security and disaster anal-
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ysis, especially earthquake in sociological, political, and anthropological researches on disasters 
in Iran. The study also seeks the way to reduce human insecurity and enhance coping mecha-
nisms with regard to disaster vulnerability through learning about people’s ‘heritage’ and ‘social 
capital’ as a means of empowerment. Ultimately, it suggests an analytical framework for disas-
ter and human security. Considering the questions and assumptions of the present research, 
we have primarily adopted a case study method and a qualitative research approach within 
it. The study is based on a series of fieldwork conducted mainly in 2007.
2. Concepts and research framework
2.1. Concept of security : a historical narrative
Security is one of those conceptions which have caused a lot of dispute around its defini-
tion and nature in many intellectual fields. It has been described as a ‘symbol’ (Wolfers, 1952), 
an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Buzan, 1983), an ‘ambiguous/privative and dual concept’ 
(Dillon, 1996), a ‘speech act’ (Wæver, 1995), a ‘metaphor’ (Chilton, 1996), a ‘neglected concept’ 
(Baldwin, 1997), a ‘thick signifier’ (Huysmans, 1998), a ‘language game’ (Fierke, 1998), a ‘leit-
motif’ (Debiel and Werthes, 2005), and a ‘promiscuous concept’ (Zedner, 2009). This ambigu-
ous and multi-faceted concept of security can be recognized through a terminological journey 
back to the Greek (asphalia) and Latin (sine cura/sicuritas) roots which then carried over into 
the English term, security. Asphaleia is the privative of the verb sphallo—i.e. a-sphaleia. 
Sphallo means to err, to cause to fall or to fail, to bring down…. It was translated into Latin as 
fallo—to fall. Hence, the privative asphaleia is to avoid falling … (or a) mistake (Dillon, 
1996 : 124).
The English word ‘security’, of course, derives directly from the Latin securitas/securus, 
which, in turn, is derived from the compound sine cura. Sine cura comprises sine, meaning 
without, and cura from curio meaning troubling ; solicitude ; carefulness ; … anxiety. Hence, 
sine cura (and sinecure) : without solicitude ; free from cares ; … easy. Securitas is conse-
quently defined as freedom from concern ; unconcern ; composure ; freedom from danger ; 
safety ; security (Dillon, 1996 : 125). Cicero and Lucretius frequently referred to securitas as 
a kind of philosophical and psychological state of being free from mental perturbation, tranquil-
ity or peace of mind (Brauch, 2005 : 6 ; Dillon, 1996 : 125).
This usage of the concept of security was carried down historically until quite recent times 
when security was still considered and related to the feeling of the individual sphere, but from 
the eighteenth century, signs of a conceptual evolution of security were starting to show 
(McFarlane & Khong, 2006 ; Rothschild, 1995). From then until now the concept has been 
defined and interpreted in different ways. The issue of security has long preoccupied the 
minds of scholars. One of the simplest, broadest and most reiterated definitions of security 
was suggested in a classic essay by Wolfers (1952). ‘Security’, he says, ‘points to some degree 
of protection of values previously acquired’ (Wolfers, 1952 : 484). Then, in order to specify 
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the concept further, Wolfers adds two dimensions to his definition : ‘security in an objective 
sense measures absence of the threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of 
fear that such values will be attacked’3) (1952 : 485).
Baldwin (1997), aiming to construct a formulation of conceptual analysis recognized the 
unattainability of the absence of threats, further defines security as ‘a low probability of damage 
to acquired values’ (1997 : 13). This understanding places emphasis on the preservation of 
acquired values, which he thinks is loyal to the spirit of Wolfers’ meaning. He exemplifies this 
graded definition with threats like military attack, or earthquakes, in response to which some 
degree of security is provided—like a deterrence policy or building codes—to lower the proba-
bility of damage to acquired values (Baldwin, 1997). Then, in pursuit of his concern with the 
criteria required for an analysis of security, he asks questions that might help to define ‘security 
in its most general sense’ which can be measured ‘in terms of two specifications : security for 
whom? And security for which values?’ (1997 : 13) In so doing, he leaves out Wolfers’ sub-
jective sense and frees himself of the ‘absence of threats’ in an absolute sense by grading the 
levels of threats/security. He notes that the distinction between the objective and subjective 
dimensions becomes clearer when we ask ‘security for whom?’ To show the abstract and gen-
eral character of his criteria for a definition, he states the answer we might consider can range 
from‘some, most or all’ individuals, states, or international systems, in relation to the research 
question under consideration (Baldwin, 1997). This diversity is further extended by the 
necessity of specifying the values for which security is sought.
But, somehow, these questions seem challengeable. For instance, giving grades to secu-
rity does not sound as if it fits with the main logic of the ‘unattainability of absolute security’ in 
Baldwin’s discussion. Because, if security is relational and since, and if there is nothing intrin-
sic or essential in a relational concept, then a relational concept of security also cannot deter-
mine its own content which is in contrast with the aim of Baldwin to build an analysis of secu-
rity in its abstract and general sense. Others, like Buzan et al. (1998), Booth (2007), and later 
Møller (2003), Wibben (2008), and Tajbakhsh & Chenoy (2007), also discussed the question sets 
of the concept of security.
Buzan (1991) thinks that questions like ‘whose security’ and ‘security of what’ should be 
considered as one. This notion takes its rise in Buzan’s definition of security, although he him-
self notes that security is an essentially contested concept, so we cannot come to an agreed def-
inition of security. Security, according to Buzan, ‘is taken to be about the pursuit of threat’, and 
‘survival’ is the bottom line (1991 : 432-433). Booth, in contrast to Buzan (1991), notes that ‘if 
we cannot name security, how can we ever hope to achieve it? (1991 : 317). Another matter 
of disagreement lies in Buzan’s famous claim about the ‘essentially contested’ character of the 
concept of security. McSweeney (1999) points out that the phrase ‘essentially contested’ gives 
an exceptional advantage to the concept of security in comparison to other similar concepts like 
‘the state’ and ‘justice’. He insists that if it is regarded as an essentially contested concepts in 
social science or international relations, then these are equally contestable, too (1999 : 83-
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4). Booth also assumes that it would be more correct to use the word ‘contingently rather 
than essentially contested’. He proposes that ‘security as a basic concept consists of core ele-
ments [a referent object, threats, and means] that are not essentially contested’, and ‘reveal 
security to be a simple concept at heart, as Hobbes (1651) understood four centuries ago’, but 
when it was imposed on world politics this simple core became a complex concept ‘as the layers 
of politics are wrapped around it’ (2007 : 100). ‘The problem of security’, Booth concludes, ‘is 
not in the meaning of the concept, but in the politics of the meaning that derive from different 
political theories’ (2007 : 101). That is to say, the questions ‘we’ pose—about which referent 
objects (states or people), and on which threats to the chosen referent, should be prioritized 
(military, economic, short term or long term) to overcome those threats (force or negotiations, 
police, camera setting, etc.)—has an influence on the conceptualizing and operationalizing of 
security in contingent contexts in world politics (Booth, 2007).
Although these conceptual presentations of security’s content and question sets seem to 
be useful tools to identify and analyze threats and their subjects and objects, these narratives 
are overly focused on the contents of security and on linguistic aspects. So far, the integral of 
all these definitions is the absence of threats or the freedom from threats or danger. Viewing 
security just from this framework of content and threats seems to leave little space for endeav-
ors to find alternative propositions of security. This makes sense especially when we want to 
mainstream the concept of human security in contemporary discourse.
2.2. A definition of security through ‘Authorization’ : social contract
 Until now what has been at the core of all these debates is their preoccupation with con-
ceptualizing security in accordance with its content—threats, danger and risk. Here, we fur-
ther view the conception of security from another angle namely ‘authorization’ by Moore (2011) 
which might provide an alternative to content- and threat-based conceptions of security. In 
the article titled ‘Citizens into Wolves? Carl Schmitt’s Fictive Account of Security’, Moore 
(2011) calls for investigating security regimes through a complex process of authorization (or an 
epistemic view). The ‘concern with the process of authorization—how security decisions are 
allocated as security—transfers security away from the territory of the sovereign decision 
towards security as a public, negotiated discourse at the core of political communities’ (Moore, 
2011 : 503). To explore this, he goes back to a comparison between the notions of Thomas 
Hobbes’s Leviathan ([1651] 1996) and Carl Schmitt’s4) Political Theory ([1938] 1996). Moore 
intends to confront Hobbes’s and Schmitt’s account of security regime, not just as a compara-
tive act in itself. Rather, he wants to show how much a security regime is based on authoriza-
tion and social contract. He notes that Hobbes’s security account constructs a contingent and 
contractual security regime, namely the process of authorization, which might provide us with 
an answer for the epistemic question of how security is instituted within security discourse 
today. By contrast, Schmitt’s concept of security, as the foundation of a contemporary interna-
tional security paradigm, is an attempt to naturalize security through the state. This results in 
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a security conception as a ‘condition rather than a regime’ and overlooks the contractual basis 
of security.
 Moore proposes that there is value in examining the Hobbesian contractual account of 
security for the sake of an alternative to international security theory that goes beyond a single 
paradigm of state-centricity, in preference to Schmitt’s approach. Therefore it is important to 
understand how social contract theory, as a representative device, though theoretical, creating 
and distributing rights and responsibilities between political subjects and their state, has been 
viewed in Hobbes’s and Schmitt’s accounts. Here then, a security regime is defined as ‘knowl-
edges in which authoritative claims about security and danger are constructed and distributed 
within a broader discourse’ (Moore, 2011 : 503). Schmitt’s political theory, embedded in 
Hobbes’s theory of the state and sovereignty, presents a valuable source to scrutinize the roots 
of security’s evolution in the modern state. Schmitt looks into security as the technology of 
the state ‘the most total of all totalities’ ([1938] 1996 : 82), and offers scholars of international 
relations a theory of security ‘stripped bare of social contract’ (Moore, 2011 : 504).
Schmitt’s reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan is based on ontological logic and a strategic politi-
cal myth that enables security via the state. The metaphor of the Leviathan in Hobbes’s 
account is used as a provider of order and might be based on the ‘logic’ of contract, while in 
Schmitt’s reading of Leviathan, it ultimately dissolves the logic of the social contract under the 
‘full force’ of a ‘higher legal order’, the ‘political premium’ namely a security regime (Moore, 
2011). Leviathan is an artificial man who has a real effect in making possible an exception to 
the norm and an authoritative construction of a regime. This is in contrast to Hobbes’s theory 
by which the artificial man has been authorized when it became a representative of the public. 
Hobbes endorses the covenant as a way to achieve ‘peace and common defense’ in the state of 
nature. In other words, Hobbes changes the source of legitimation or authorization from 
heaven to earth through endowing the covenant with a discourse of political rights for the mul-
titude (Orwin, 1975).
Schmitt intentionally neglects the contractual foundation of the security regime in Hobbes, 
whilst he uses Hobbes’s idea of security. Where Schmitt provides his own perception of the 
state of nature, it is inherently different from Hobbes’s state of nature. Hobbes regards a state 
of war among individuals as a pre-cultural situation that has been restrained by contract. ‘The 
state of nature’ as Hobbes clarifies ‘offers nothing in terms of cultural, political and moral pro-
duction’ ([1651] 1996 : 89). On the other hand, Schmitt posits it as a state of war between 
groups (nations) with the absolute expression of subjects—dominion over all political entities 
by the state. This is because Schmitt looks down on work about the contractual dimension of 
security, which is fundamental to Hobbes’s notion to stop the state of nature, and simply shifts 
the political discourse from individuals to the state level. Consequently, the contingency of 
security discourse is neglected by Schmitt. This means Schmitt’s security conception ‘is no 
longer the rational extension of the values of political community’ (Moore, 2011 : 514). A 
security regime without authorization (social contract) is doomed to provide state with a free 
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hand and make citizens into docile subjects. This is against notions like Arendt’s arête/virtue 
or public sphere, which shows the division of public and private spheres and argues the public 
realm ‘gather us together and yet prevents us falling over each other so to speak’ (1958 : 52, 
cited in Moore, 2011 : 517).
Where notions of security are inspired by Schmitt’s account of danger and risk, the pre-
agreement understanding of the form and content of security becomes unavoidable. In other 
words, a naturalized security regime gives a greater priority to sovereign decisions than the 
question of authorization. It casts off the constitutive dimensions of security. Subsequently, 
a security discourse without authorization takes away the capacity of people to contest the 
issues of security and determine their rights of security.
2.3. A brief review of local knowledge concept
There is agreement neither on the name nor on definition of the concept of local knowl-
edge. A variety of terminologies are used to describe the concept, like ‘local’, ‘indigenous’, 
‘indigenous technical’, ‘folk’, ‘traditional’, ‘traditional environmental’, ‘people’s science’ or ‘rural 
people’s knowledge’. In summarizing the main presumed characteristics of definitions of local 
knowledge, most authors describe it as “a body of knowledge associated with the long-term 
occupancy of a certain place” (Dei et al., 2000, p. 6). Local knowledge is “tacit, intuitive, expe-
riential, informal, uncodified knowledge”, as opposed to the “literate” or “expert” knowledge 
typically attributed to Western science. Local knowledge is local, orally transmitted, and 
empirical rather than theoretical, largely functional, and embedded mostly in an encompassing 
cultural matrix (Sundar, 2000 ; in Ellen et al.). This definition of local knowledge can in part 
be negative and controversial. Many scholars, like Geertz (1991) and Agrawal (1995a), have 
challenged this view of local knowledge. Geertz pointed to the dynamic relativity of the term 
local with universal. In a similar vein, Agrawal argued that there is no distinction between 
local knowledge and western knowledge and the whole dichotomy imposes a distinguishing 
logic of “us” and “them” and connotes hegemonic opposition between a folk or embodied 
knowledge and a high or systematized knowledge (Sundar, 2000).
Historically, local knowledge was marginalized (made mute) by the late colonial, European 
scientific fieldwork, then it became subject to ignorance. Indigeneity was defined as a state of 
backwardness which needs to be translated into progress and development (Ellen et al., 2000). 
After fifty years or more of the dominant model of development with its centralized, technically 
oriented solutions and its failure to deliver on its promises, local knowledge came to occupy a 
privileged position in the discussion of how development can best be brought about with repre-
sentations of it being in harmony with nature, and indigenous people’s needs as associated with 
preserving the conservation of their culture and knowledge (Brokensha et al., 1980 ; Compton, 
1989 ; Gupta, 1992 ; Niamir, 1990 ; Warren, 1990).
In rhetoric and academia, it was first acclaimed and advocated by anthropologists, and then 
criticized. Both debates appeared in ‘Current Anthropology’ in 1998, and these still con-
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tinue. The advocacy of local knowledge was founded upon the earliest pioneer writings of 
many anthropologists and ethnographers (see for example, Conklin, 1957 ; Lewis, 1975 ; 
Wyman, 1964). This was followed by Barker, Bell, Belshaw, Chambers, Howes, and Richards 
(all in 1979) and the seminal work by Brokensha, Warren and Werner (1980) and subsequently 
by Scoones and Thompson (1994). As local knowledge was welcomed by academic and devel-
opment practitioners, there arose debates around the definitions and rhetoric of the term. 
Some of the highlighted debates and theories are about the dichotomy in the definitions of tradi-
tional knowledge, where traditional knowledge is contrasted with scientific knowledge, the way 
of classification of local knowledge and, recently, about different systems of patents in capitalist 
property rights vs. local knowledge. In this regard, the main critiques were pioneered by 
Agrawal (1995a) who criticized the mode of distinction between local knowledge and western 
knowledge. He argues that the dichotomy between Western and local knowledge “idealizes 
and obscures knowledge and practice, disempowering peoples and systems through artificially 
constrictive frameworks” (Agrawal, 1995a, p. 5).
This criticism generated a lot of debates in the field. However, others like Christoph Ant-
weiler took a middle path. He argued that indigenous knowledge and western science “display 
both commonalities and differences” (1998, 24). Another issue arose in the discussion around 
local or indigenous knowledge. This was due to the practice and use of indigenous knowledge 
in development, which uncovered several problems. When indigenous knowledge became a 
tool of development, it was mainly reduced to bits of knowledge disembodied from the rest of 
the culture and society, typically collected like a system of “packages of practices”, like the 
works of Alcorn (1995), which makes a lists of ‘the kinds of resources which can be ‘mined’ 
from ethno-botanical knowledge : principles, facts, technologies, crops, farming systems, strat-
egies, and information on local constructions and opportunities’ (Ellen and Harris, 2000). 
These debates were followed by different systems of patents in capitalist property rights vs. 
local knowledge. These scholars argue that many indigenous systems are associated with a 
culturally determined diversity of property rights regimes (Fernando, 2003).
As the previous sections have explicated, the overall approach taken in this research is that 
of human security. In regard to human security’s core arguments on people-centric action and 
empowerment, the local knowledge concept is assumed to be well suited to an analytical frame-
work of human security and disaster which deals with how people cope with and behave in a 
post-disaster situation with the aim of empowerment as in the case study of Bam, Iran. By 
considering the above discussion, local knowledge has made a contribution here as a dynamic, 
cultural, social and political consideration of a community in the context of power relations.
2.4. Human security framework on disaster analysis
2.4.1. Human security definition
 The concept of human security can be regard as the outcome of the latest attempts in the 
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various lines of critical studies on security, peace and development. Beside this, it also takes 
its place along the long road of efforts to broaden a horizontal stretch of the content of security 
so that it can be involved in non-militaristic threats like the economic, the political, the social 
and the environmental, and/or deepen the vertical stretch of the substance of security down-
ward from the securing state to the individual/person—human security—or upward to coopera-
tive security, common security, comprehensive security, global security (Krause and Williams, 
1996 ; Paris, 2001).
The concept of human security has been introduced into the international system for more 
than a decade now, ever since it was coined by the Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq in the 
Human Development Report 1994 commissioned by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP, 1994). The overall objective of the report was the extension of security—this oppor-
tunity was provided by the optimism and anxieties associated with the end of the Cold War—to 
encompass non-military threats from economic and environmental domains, to critique elite-
directed, modernizing, growth-obsessed development, and to advocate for equitable, ‘bottom-
up’, people-oriented or ‘human development’ ; and the reconfiguration of the state as instru-
mental for security but not its referent (Thomas, 2000). Thus, Human Security is chara cte rized 
as shifting the referent object of security ‘from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a 
much greater stress on people’s security’ (UNDP, 1994 : 22, 24 ; see also Krause, 2004).
In parallel with these attempts in the United Nations—though the concept was born in the 
‘policy world’ and did not spring from academics or analysts (Krause, 2004)—it had influence on 
a wide range of think tanks, research centers, professional politicians, activists, journalists, 
bureaucrats, and diplomats in the 1990s, whether on a nation state, regional or global level5) 
(Human Security Unit, 2009, 55-57 ; see also Krause, 2004). It also significantly shaped the 
foreign policy agendas of medium power states, such as Canada, Japan and Norway—though 
just in a way of describing or framing what they were doing, that allowed a number of disparate 
policy initiatives to be linked and given greater coherence (Krause, 2004 ; Jolly and Ray, 
2006 ; Shani et al., 2007 ; MacLean et al., 2006).
There are three especially important institutional definitions of human security that we 
must briefly consider : the UNDP’s, the CHS’s, and that of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (see e.g. Alkire, 2003). In 1994, with the UNDP 
HDR6), the original formulation of human security was defined as the security of people, their 
‘freedom from fear’, and ‘freedom from want’, in ‘safety from such chronic threats as hunger, 
disease and repression’ and ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of 
daily life in the economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political secu-
rity domains’ (UNDP, 1994 : 23). This definition has nevertheless been criticized for its broad 
focus on threats.
Another institutional definition of human security was proposed by the International Com-
mission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which developed the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) principle in 2001. It also defined human security broadly as ‘the security of peo-
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ple—their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and 
worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms’ 
(ICISS, 2001 : 15). According to the commission, human security requires attention to the 
security of ‘ordinary people’ in their everyday lives.
Subsequently, on obtaining greater conceptual clarity and providing a working definition, 
the Japanese Government, in cooperation with the United Nations (UN), established the Com-
mission on Human Security (CHS), entitled Human Security Now, in 2003. This became an 
important milestone in the human security literature. The Commission’s definition was obvi-
ously influenced by its co-chairs Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen. The Commission directly 
endorsed the concept of human security as safeguarding the ‘vital core’ of all human lives from 
‘critical’ and ‘pervasive’ threats in ways consistent with their long-term fulfillment. It also 
states human security as protecting and empowering people, and consequently understands this 
reading of global security as a universal need ; for example, the need to be free from fear and 
free from want (CHS, 2003 : 1-4).
Besides these institutional/formal definitions, there are plenty of definitions ranging from 
the national (for example, Canada’s narrower approach and Japan’s and Thailand’s wider poli-
cies), through regional, NGOs and the scholarly (see e.g. Peou ed., 2009 ; Capie and Evans, 
2007) to the academic literature on human security7) that have been divided over whether they 
support (see e.g. Caroline Thomas, 2001 ; King and Murray, 2001 ; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 
2007) or reject the concept (Paris, 2001 ; Neufeld, 2004 ; Duffield and Waddell, 2004 ; Booth, 
2004 ; Dillon, 2006 ; Chandler, 2008), whether they subscribe to a broad or narrow conception, 
whether human security displaces or complements national security and whether there is a 
threshold that must be satisfied—meaning that a threat must endanger human life for it be 
accepted as a threat (see e.g. Suhrke, 1999 ; Roberts, 2008 ; Taylor Owen, 2008 ; Wibben, 
2008).
Considering the conception of security with respect to authorization and social contract, for 
the purpose of this research on disaster, human security is regarded as a public discourse of the 
(re)negotiation of rights to basic needs through the social contract. We will take the discussion 
further in the next section. The concern for a social contract, here, rests on the way in which 
contracts legitimize or authorize security and government authority, and ensure and distribute 
rights and responsibilities between government and citizens (see also, Boucher and Kelly, 
1994 ; Hampton, 1997 ; Pelling and Dill, 2008 ; O’Brien et al., 2009).
The primary premise is that the continuation and expansion of any political regime is guar-
anteed by striking a balance between competing security interests of the citizens and their gov-
ernment. However, when the balance is broken, particularly in a post-disaster situation which 
challenges most political systems, the process of a social contract arrives at a point which might 
cause the opening up of a renegotiation of rights and claims, either individual or communal, 
between the state and its citizens—even non-state actors—in the provision of new arrange-
ments for stability, order, protection and security. This is the moment Pelling and Dill, (2010) 
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discussed regarding how the existing social contract may be contested and can be understood 
as the expression of claims to rights and the revealing of the political (see e.g. Isin, 2002).
2.4.2. Analytical framework
 Disaster Politics : While disaster studies have long observed the connection between 
disaster and politics, this ultimately rested on an implicit conception. Olson (2000) cites two 
reasons for this. One was related to a perspective of the leading fields in disaster studies, such 
as sociology and geography. The other was coyness about using the normative connotation of 
the politics of disaster not only among disaster researchers but also even among those who read 
about it. Put in the words of Drury and Olson, disaster politics ‘conjures up images of short-
sightedness, self-interest, corruption, and everything that is bad about government, including 
official denials that a disaster has occurred or is occurring’ (1998 : 1). In 1983, Cuny, with his 
seminal work on Disasters and Development, explicitly stated a direct relation between natural 
disasters and political destabilization : ‘Disasters’ Cuny points out ‘often highlight the social 
struggles in a society and underscore the inherent inequities within a political system’, and a 
‘disaster makes it very evident that the poor are vulnerable because they are poor, and this can 
lead to profound political and social changes within a society : many governments destabilize in 
the years immediately following a disaster’ (1983 : 54). Others, like Hewitt (1983), also criti-
cized the attempts made to separate and neutralize natural disasters from development and pol-
itics and represent them as isolated phenomena (Pelling and Dill, 2009).
 By the end of the 1980s, disaster politics had established a place for itself with an increas-
ing attention being paid to pre-disaster situations of vulnerability and political/critical studies, 
particularly about humanitarian aid and interventions. Researchers have seen increasing rates 
of poverty correlated to humanitarian aid (Hewitt, 1983). Though, they were mainly preoccu-
pied by the pre-disaster situation and few studies dealt with the political impact of a disaster in 
the post-disaster (Pelling, 2001, 2006). Albala-Bertrand (1993), in The Political Economy of 
Large Natural Disasters, pioneered analytical research on a positive relationship between disas-
ters and long-term political outcomes in developing countries, in cases such as 1972 the Mana-
gua Earthquake, and the East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Typhoon and the Ethiopian famines in 
1973 and 1974. His core argument was that international disaster management tries to por-
tray a massive and negative assessment of the macroeconomic impacts of disasters, when there 
is ‘a high correlation, especially between the primary victims and both international assistance 
and overall political unrest’ (1993 : 105). This will then be secured by top-down economy-
oriented disaster recovery plans, accompanied by vast development projects linked to donated 
or loaned capital and the global market. His other findings also indicate that society’s pre-
disaster conditions characterize the effects of disasters socially, technologically, politically and 
economically. Contrary to the above political economy approaches, Drury and Olson (1998) 
have chosen a quantitative analysis to identify the degrees of causal relationships among a 
range of variables, such as the level of development, a regime’s repressiveness, international 
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assistance, disaster severity, prior political and social unrest and income inequality, and post-
disaster, politically-induced unrest. To measure these variables, they examined the impact of 
severe disasters in six cases with more than 1,500 human losses from 1966 and 1980. Their 
findings indicated that income inequality (or low income) was more positive in terms resulting 
in post-disaster unrest than extreme poverty. They also recognize time decay as an indicator 
in increasing political unrest after a disaster. Their findings accepted Albala-Berterand’s argu-
ment about the pre-disaster unrest situation as being more prescient about post-disaster politi-
cal unrest than positively correlated.
 With increasing attention being paid to climate change and rapid urbanization, some major 
international organizations, such as the UN-HABIT (2007) program and IPCC (2007), have pre-
ferred to address the effects of post-disasters on reconstruction and political systems. This 
was more seriously recognized to be a consequence of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. The 
instances of Aceh and its success in a peace agreement with the Indonesian government, Myan-
mar’s Cyclone Nargis and China’s Sichuan earthquake all confirm the political aspects and 
impacts of disasters. Disasters are not unique and neutral events.
In another vein, Pelling and Dill (2006) through a qualitative survey of historical data on 
disasters from 1899 to 2005, propose through case studies seven hypotheses for analyzing post-
disaster political change. In short, these emphasize that politically peripheral regions are 
more likely to experience increased tension because of effects of development politics that 
exacerbated existing inequalities. Political regimes differently predict and respond to post-
disaster mobilization of non-state actors, some respond repressively while others try to manip-
ulate disaster events in order to extend their popular legitimacy and the reverse is also possible 
for non-state actors to manipulate disaster events aiming at seizing power. Their findings, 
however, point out similarities in response to disasters by either democratic or authoritarian 
regimes, and this response is mainly due to pre-disaster social conditions.
Analytical framework : After exploring various concepts and theories related to this 
research, we present an analytical framework for investigating human security and the dynam-
ics of social forces in the post-disaster situation, especially earthquakes. For this, Pelling and 
Dill, (2010)’s Disaster Politics : Tipping Points for Change in the Adaptation of Social Regimes, 
will be adopted as a model for analyzing the case study of Bam, Iran. Concerned with the ana-
lytical gap in geographical studies of disaster politics, Pelling and Dill, (2010) draw an analytical 
framework based on a summary of the existing literature and its legacy. Their survey of the 
existing literature indicates that the causal relationship between catastrophic natural disasters 
and potential political outcomes is either suppressed by, or results in, political change. How-
ever, a gap in coherent and systematic analysis is recognized in two areas. One is associated 
with the fact that the diverse views, scales and aims of the knowledge contributed to disaster 
politics, which ranges from governmentality and humanitarian denial to political economy and 
human security. The other shows that few works built their theoretical base on empirical case 
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studies (Pelling and Dill, 2008). Pelling and Dill (2010) take this challenge further by identify-
ing the ‘tipping points’ in the political impact of a natural disaster. According to Pelling and 
Dill, the tipping points are ‘critical historical moments or broader influence on systems (internal 
and external) that determine the direction and significance of change’ (2010 : 22). Regarding 
this definition, two types of outcome are acknowledged. In the first, the changes result in sta-
bilizing the status quo regime (see e.g. Klein, 2007), while, in the other, disasters act as cata-
lysts for a watershed moment leading to change in the established political situation—contest-
ing political power/ the social contract (see, Olson and Grwronski, 2003 ; Pelling and Dill, 2006, 
2008, 2010). Then, change can take place in manifolds from policy discourse to resource flows 
especially in the distribution of aid and material during relief or reconstruction through many 
scales at many levels, such as the international, the national or the sub-national.
 The moments : For the purpose of this research, disaster politics is defined such that it 
‘focuses on the interaction of social and political actors and framing institutions in preparing for 
and responding to extreme natural events and suggests that disaster events and their manage-
ment are part of unfolding political histories’ (Pelling and Dill, 2010 : 21). Based on the four 
moments of the analytical framework by Pelling and Dill (2010), we construct the an analysis of 
disaster, human security and local knowledge to identify whether there is a potential for politi-
cal change in contesting the existing social contract to achieve human security, and we examine 
the outcomes of these changes in historical learning and the local knowledge of people from a 
disaster, using the case study of Bam.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the framework is grounded on a cycle of dynamics of historical 
learning/local knowledge to meet or encounter disaster risk. As aforementioned, local knowl-
edge is a dynamic cultural, social and political consideration in a community in the context of 
power relations and a holistic view which has the potential to reduce disaster vulnerability, and 
it is not a specialized knowledge for the mitigation of an earthquake. This includes negative 
and positive (missed-opportunities, inequalities and failures as well as socially and culturally 
invaluable capacities), progressive and regressive outcomes resulting from functioning tipping 
points suppressed for the sake of an accelerated status quo or political change and a contested 
social contract. These have impacts on the next generation of knowledge and historical learn-
ing, which, in turn, can be significant during the occurrence of a disaster. These grounds 
shape :
• The first moment post-disaster that concentrates on to what extent the uneven social 
and special distribution of losses and recovery opportunities can result in contesting 
political and developmental discourses.
• The second moment explains how non-state actors mobilize their social/political sources 
to campaign to seize the critical discourse.
• The third moment of Figure 1 manifests the institutionalization of campaign discourse 
into policy and legislation through a renegotiation of human security. The renegotiation 
of human security ‘takes place through three potentially reinforcing domains—the tech-
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nical, policy and political change. Each domain can contribute to a critical juncture in 
the social contract, progressive or regressive for human security’ (Pelling and Dill, 
2010 : 30).
• The resultant potential change likely ranges from the political through policy to new 
political arrangements (social contracts/human security). These moments feedback 
into a dynamics of historical learning and local knowledge to meet or improve resilience 
against the risk of a disaster.
There is another important element, like international (non) governmental organizations, 
foreign powers and, generally the international and regional context. They can influence the 
first three moments of development failures, non-state actors and the renegotiation of human 
security. It is important to note here that, in our empirical case study survey, any of these 
moments can show an overlap or be revealed at different stages of the post-disaster process.
3. The case study of Bam : the geographical context
The City of Bam is located in Kerman Province in the southeast of Iran, approximately 193 
km from Kerman city (capital of the province) and 1,220 km from Tehran. The city has a total 
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Figure 1 The human security and disaster analytical framework 
 (Adopted from Pelling and Dill (2010) with slight modification)
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area of 19,374 sq. km (Figure 2). The city is composed of five districts (Markazi, Roudab, 
Rikan, Fahraj and Narmashir), five towns (Baravat, Roudab, Mohammad Abad, Fahraj and Ros-
tam Abad) and thirteen villages (Houmeh, Deh Bakri, Kork, Nartij, East Roudab, West Roudab, 
Chah Dekal, Rikan, Gonbaki, Gavkan, Borj e Akram, Fahraj, Posht Rood and Aziz Abad).
Because of the city’s location on the margin of the Lut-e-Zangi Ahmad desert, it is hot in 
the summers with temperatures of up to 50°C and cold in the winters with temperatures below 
the freezing point. The region also includes a range of mountains to the north of Bam extend-
ing northwest and the Jebal-e-Barez mountain range to the Southwest of Bam extending in a 
northwest-southeast direction. Water sources within these mountain ranges are the main 
suppliers for the qanat (traditional irrigation) system in Bam, Baravat and their satellite vil-
lages. The seasonal Posht-Rood River that flows to the north of Bam city is dry during much 
of the year.
The city of Bam had never a record of earthquakes prior to 2003. The city, though, is sit-
uated in a highly active seismic zone along two major faults, Bam and Gowk. The Gowk Fault 
is located in the northwest-southeast and the Bam Fault in North-South direction towards Jebal 
Barez. However, four major earthquakes related to Gowk Fault have shaken the region in a 
period of two decades (the 1980s and the 1990s) : the Golbaf earthquake of 11 June 1981 (6.6 
on the Richter scale) with 1,100 deaths and more than 4,000 injured, the Srich earthquake of 28 
July 1981 (7.0) with nearly 1,300 deaths, the South Golbaf earthquake of 20 November 1989 
(5.6) with 4 deaths and 45 injured, and the North Golbak earthquake of 14 March 1998 (6.6) 
Figure 2 The City of Bam and surrounding rural areas, Iran.
 Image source : NASA Landsat Program, 2008, Landsat ETM+ scene L71159040_04020050408, 
Ortho, GLS2005, USGS, Sioux Falls, 8 Apr. 2005.
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with 5 deaths and about 50 injured (Hessami et al., 2004 ; Berberian and Yeats, 1999 ; Berbe-
rian et al., 2001).
The total population of Bam before the earthquake was 142,375 with around 17,000 fami-
lies. Its rural area, such as Baravat, near the city of Bam, had around 17,000 residents with 
3,000 families. The total population of Bam and its rural area was 277,835. Of this number, 
51% lived in the urban area (Bam) and the rest in rural areas which means many people live in 
the rural areas of the region (Iran National Census, 2006). More than half of the people in Bam 
are literate, but many educated people have left the city for better jobs in other main cities, like 
Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz and Kerman.
Bam is one of the unique agricultural poles of Iran, and is famous internationally because of 
its date production. More than 25%, or around 18,241 families, of Bam residents are farmers. 
They farm lands of about 18,499 acres (Khazai and Hausler, 2005). Iran ranks (or ranked) 
number one in date production and exported more than 250,000 tons of dates annually, a consid-
erable portion of which is (or was) produced in Bam. This is mainly because of the good qual-
ity of the soil and the traditional irrigation systems of qanat. These made the city of Bam the 
jewel of the desert. Bam also has tourist sites like Arg-e-Bam (the Bam Citadel), with more 
than 100,000 national and international visitors annually. The citadel was a remarkable exam-
ple of a fortified medieval town that was built using the vernacular technique of mud layers.
4. The earthquake and disaster plans
4.1. The earthquake onset in Bam
The 2003 Bam earthquake, according to official estimates, killed more than 30,000 people, 
21,000 injured and 75,000 left homeless, in the city of Bam (Walter, 2004). More than 90% of 
the building stock, according to the United Nations’ assessment team, was damaged by about 60 
to 100%, and, the rest, 10% suffered about 40 to 60% damage (EERI, 2004). The economic 
damage was estimated at around US$ 1.5 billion dollars (US$ 1.2 billion direct damage and US$ 
0.3 billion indirect damage). This meant 1% decrease in Iran’s GDP (US$ 1,355 billion) growth 
in 2003 (see e.g. IFRCRCS, 2004 ; EERI, 2004 ; UNDP, 2005, 2006). The lifeline infrastruc-
ture of the city, including the water supply, power, telephone, healthcare/emergency services, 
government buildings, main roads and the only airport were paralyzed by the earthquake 
(Akbari et al., 2004). Specifically, the loss of medical facilities meant that emergency assis-
tance was not available. There was also significant damage to the major historical/tourist 
attraction of Bam, namely the 2,400-year-old citadel (Arg-e-Bam), the world’s largest dried 
clay structure. Besides, damages to more than 65 active qanat (Manafpour, 2004) had a critical 
impact on the livelihood of date farmers and their date orchards. But what were the causes of 
such a severe disaster in Bam, given that almost every week earthquakes of a similar magni-
tude occur somewhere in the world with no such devastating effect?
In the aftermath of the earthquake, two kinds of attempts have mainly been recognized 
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when exploring the intensity of the catastrophe. One takes techno-centric point of view 
rooted in engineering and seismology. The other concentrates more on developmental and 
structural explanations (Smith and Petley, 2009). The first group identified the causes of 
severe devastation mainly in the rupture dynamics in an unknown fault (not the Bam Fault) 
5km to the west and near the city. It shocked almost directly under the city (see e.g. Peyret et 
al., 2007). The earthquake, therefore, right into the urban area, was felt as intensive ground 
tremors (Bouchon et al., 2006). All of these surveys concluded that the severe strength of the 
surface tremors localized and coincided with the zone of damage to the city, and this ultimately 
ensured that most of the buildings would have been collapsed even if they had been reinforced 
according to standard building codes (see e.g. Ahmadizadeh and Shakib, 2004 ; Smith and Pet-
ley, 2009).
The second group, however, emphasizes the poor quality of building in Bam, which relates 
to the high number of deaths under the collapsed buildings. In so doing, they specifically 
directed their blame at the adobe structures in Bam and the Citadel (see e.g. Gharaati, 2008). 
However, Langenbach (2004) observed that though the adobe buildings were damaged in the 
earthquake, the fatalities were not limited to these structures alone. Ghafory-Ashtiany and 
Hosseini (2007) found that 54% of the houses were constructed of adobe brick, and the remain-
ing 46% were made using modern materials like steel and concrete. In fact, buildings less 
than 30 years old had the most loss of life (Smith and Petley, 2009). Photo 1 indicates that 
many recently constructed buildings as well as adobe structures were severely damaged or col-
lapsed. Apart from these two reasons for the high level of losses, some others have been 
identified, for example, the ‘lack of preparedness on the part of the authorities, such as the dam-
age to the lifeline infrastructure, like the medical facilities, fire stations and the emergency ser-
vices, and a lack of coordination among government organizations and also between them and 
international agencies and the Iranian army (Smith and Petley, 2009). Official reports, how-
ever, have mainly focused on the adobe structures.
Photo 1 Damage to adobe-style buildings that also used new materials (left) and modern buildings 
(right).
 Source : Author, May 2007
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4.2. Existing disaster plans, management and institutional structures in Iran
Iran is prone to severe disasters with high levels of loss. It is a country with major faults. 
In fact, earthquakes have killed more than 180,000 people during the last 90 years (National 
Report on Disaster Reduction, 2005). The first step taken by the Iranian government was 
mainly to institute seismic safety codes, right after the massive losses of life (more than 12,225 
people) in Buein Zahra earthquake in 1962. It launched a guideline, the ‘Seismic Safety Code 
for Building’, which was supervised by the Ministry of Housing and Reclamation in 1967, and it 
subsequently delivered seismic load calculation as ‘Standard No. 519, Minimum Loads for 
Buildings’ from the Planning and Budget Organization. From the Islamic Revolution (1979) 
until now, this has been amended three times : first, in 1988, through the ‘Iranian Code for the 
Seismic Resistant Design of Buildings, Standard No. 2800’ by the Building and Housing 
Research Centre (BHRC). This was then amended twice, in 1999 and 2004 (BHRC, 2004).
The new Iranian regime has since 1979 concentrated more on the priorities of stabilizing 
its position and the Iran-Iraq War than on natural disasters despite the casualties that these 
inflict every few years. Hence, the responsibility for disasters up to that time was discharged 
by the Office of the President as a special disaster task force. Following the devastating earth-
quake in Manjil-Rudbar in 1990, a law was passed in 1991, under which the responsibilities and 
functions related to disasters were formally assigned to the Ministry of the Interior. The Min-
istry also formed two main institutions under its mandate, the Bureau for Research and Coordi-
nation of Safety and Reconstruction Affairs (BRCSR) and the National Disaster Task Force 
(NDTF). The BRSCR became a broad organization that includes many aspects ranging from 
research, coordination (domestic or international) and budget forecasting to reconstruction, 
whereas NDTF is the coordinator of inter-organizational bodies whose activities vary during 
different phases of a disaster. In a time of emergency, NDTF assumes the major coordinating 
role for relief operations carried out by technical ministries and relief organizations. During 
this time, it can be led by the Deputy Minister. It is headquartered at the Ministry of the Inte-
rior in Tehran and relies for its activities on the BRCSR, which has the same director as NDTF 
(National Report on Disaster Reduction, 2005). Moreover, there are other ministries, organi-
zations, sub-organizations and institutions that are involved in disaster management in Iran. 
All these are members of National Committee for the Natural Disaster Reduction (NCNDR) and 
the NDTF. Their main task is policy making, and to provide and exchange information related 
to their activities. However, according to Article 44 of the law of the third Economic, Social 
and Cultural Development Plan of the Country for disaster management, the National Compre-
hensive Plan for Rescue and Relief (2000) has been mandated to the Iranian Red Crescent Soci-
ety, the Ministry of the Interior and Basij8).
There are also several sub-committees and organizations under the NCNDR. The Earth-
quake Risk Reduction Council is one of its sub-committees, which is mostly about strengthen-
ing buildings, infrastructure and facilities. As Figure 3 indicates, the disaster management 
plan and system is complex and bureaucratic, and there is an overlap of responsibilities with 
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many similarly functioning institutions and sub-institutions. It also shows a nearly total 
absence of pro-active measures for meeting disasters.
5. Mobilization of non-state and state actors
5.1. The non-state sector
The first mobilization of non-state actors, such as civil society and national and local NGOs 
was revealed in the aftermath of the Bam disaster and during the relief and rescue efforts. 
The high level of human and economic losses and the government’s incompetence in prepared-
ness and mismanagement in response to the disaster were accompanied by the increasing dis-
satisfaction of the people about the slow and deficient response in the relief and distribution of 
aid for reconstruction. This was the moment that civil society and NGOs became active in 
rescue and recovery. The first organized rescue and relief teams finally arrived in Bam twelve 
hours after news of the earthquake broke. Subsequently, when rescue teams were mobilized, 
their operations were actually delayed until the next day by the problem of reaching the disaster 
area due to damage to the main roads after the collapse of some qanat and heavy traffic along 
the roads of the area for several hours (Amini Hosseini et al., 2009). This likely affected the 
rescue of trapped people from hypothermia in the below freezing temperature at night in the 
middle of winter during the first ‘golden hours’ of rescue operation (see e.g. Moszynski, 2004).
The initial response was also hindered by destruction of local lifeline facilities : For exam-
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Figure 3 A diagram of the interactive pattern of organizations and ministries involved in disaster 
management in Iran.
 Source : Author.
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ple, the Red Crescent Society’s headquarters, fire stations including their parking areas for 
emergency and public transportation vehicles, and medical centers. Of these, three main hos-
pitals in Bam, 100% of the urban health centers and 95% of the rural health centers were dam-
aged by the earthquake. This was exacerbated when the casualties included the deaths of one 
fifth of the health professionals in the region, given that the rest were not capable of providing 
aid because of their injuries and post-traumatic stress disorder. There was also considerable 
damage to their medical equipment (see e.g. Akbari et al., 2004 ; Amini Hosseini et al., 2009).
Consequently, many of the injured had to be transferred by their family members or neigh-
bors by car. Indeed, those who did not receive urgently needed medical attention died. Also, 
the hospitals in the field or in Kerman became packed with high numbers of arrivals. This 
became worse with nurses’ lack of prior training and coordination—especially where overseas 
health teams were involved—in response to serious cases (see e.g. Movahhedi, 2005 ; Nas-
rabadi et al., 2007). The depth and dimension of the earthquake also caused an inflow of mas-
sive international and national aid and relief offers from various states, international NGOs and 
national NGOs. However, with all the limelight on the international rescue teams, their effi-
ciency was limited. A total number of 34 international teams arrived in Bam from 27 coun-
tries, but they could only rescue 22 people (see e.g. IFRCRCS, 2004 ; EERI, 2004). This was 
mainly because of the reluctance of the Iranian Army to coordinate with the international agen-
cies—or even with the Iranian agencies. According to legislation passed in 2003, the Iranian 
Red Crescent Society was given authority to take the leading role in disaster response. In 
practice, though, the Iranian army was in charge, and this led to serious tension, especially over 
the use of aircraft, which further hindered the rescue and recovery effort (see e.g. IFRCRCS, 
2004 ; Smith and Petley, 2009).
Beside this, many foreign rescue teams arrived in Bam without even evaluating the infor-
mation about the local situation. For example, many of them were equipped with high-tech 
gear suitable for high-rise buildings while most of the structures in Bam were one-story 
houses. In consequence, they had little to offer to match their expertise (see e.g. Cater, 
2003 ; Pan American Health Organization, 2004 ; Amini Hosseini et al., 2009). Moreover, 
there were also complaints of mismanagement in the distribution of aid or even the storage of 
donated aid. Many people in Bam confirmed that they had received tents, clothes and water 
from officials several days after the shock. However, the affected villages received nothing for 
long after (based on author’s interview with people in 2007). While, ironically, many goods, 
thanks to the large amount of aid received, were damaged because they were stored improperly 
or there was lack of space for storage (Amini Hosseini et al., 2009).
Since the occurrence of the disaster, the people of Bam proved the incorrectness of the 
assumption that the affected population is too shocked and helpless to take responsibility for 
their own survival. Nearly 80% (2000) of the victims under the debris were saved by their 
family members, neighbors, friends and ordinary people (EERI, 2004). This may surprise 
some experts who know most about the “golden hours” (Cater, 2003), which is about the 24 
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hours in which those trapped can expect to be found alive9). It was local people who rescued 
the vast majority of survivors, often based on knowing exactly where their families and friends 
were when the disaster struck, even though most of the houses and boundaries were destroyed 
after the earthquake and it was absolutely difficult to recognize where people’s houses were and 
where an alley or street used to be. The people, especially in the rural areas, provided for 
their first needs by themselves before receiving any help or shelter from the government. 
Women baked bread and provided dates or other foodstuff they had for the survivors (their 
neighbors or relatives). They buried the dead bodies of their dearest by themselves. These 
capacities surprised many organizations who were involved in the disaster operations (based on 
author’s interviews with people in Bam and the rural areas in May, 2007).
People were particularly angry about the government’s lack of transparency in releasing 
the official number of deaths. Many survivors in Bam and the rural areas (as interviewed by 
the author during a field study) believed that the government deliberately decreased the num-
ber of deaths, which they thought to be over 50,000 people, because of their negligence of the 
seismic codes and regulations, mismanagement and their slow response. This belief even 
extended to local officials and civil society. For instance, the head of the city’s local council at 
the time (2007) said, “I think the real number of deaths is more than 50,000 people because 
many people buried their dead on the first day in collective graves where there were no officials 
yet”. Another local representative also argued that he also assumed that the deaths totaled 
more than 50,000 people, as many villages were not included in the count. However, some 
other local officials supposed that the discrepancy in the number of deaths was because of the 
speedy and hurried burials of most of the dead in collective graves in the early days after the 
earthquake, which meant that the problem of the precise number of deaths came mostly by the 
people themselves. On the other hand, Iran’s authorities announced that 26,271 were killed in 
the city of Bam as well as in its surrounding areas and districts, where a total of 142,376 people 
lived. While previously it was said that more than 41,000 had died, they explained that this 
was because some victims have been counted more than once in the chaotic aftermath of the 
disaster (BBC News10)).
5.2. The international context and the mobilization of civil society and domestic 
NGOs
As mentioned before, the scale and depth of the disaster and the unpreparedness of the 
Iranian government for its huge impact provided the ground for the activities of many local and 
national citizen’s groups and NGOs as well as international NGOs in Bam. The physical and 
social presence of these agencies in Bam, apart from their financial and humanitarian assistance, 
provoked a brief opening in the civil sphere and made people realize the underlying inefficien-
cies of their government. In an immediate response to the disaster, more than 35 domestic 
and international NGOs contributed donations, assistance relief and reconstruction. The 
amount of financial donations was estimated at US$ 120-150 million, although the Iranian gov-
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ernment never clearly announced the total amount of donations that they had received (Alavi, 
2005).
At first, the government accepted and welcomed the offers of assistance and donations, 
even from the United States of America11), while Iran’s president at the time, Khatami, admitted 
that Iran could not cope on its own and asked for outside help (BBC News12)). Subsequently, 
the United States moved direct humanitarian assistance to Iran by sending an emergency 
response team by plane—this was said to be the first United States military plane to land in Iran 
since the 1979 revolution (China Daily13)). The two countries signaled direct talks in the 
future. The Iranian government promised to comply with an agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, which supports better monitoring of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This 
led to a temporary relief of sanctions by the other side to help the rescue effort (BBC News14) ;  
BBC News15)). However, on both sides, there were some conservative voices that could not 
bear this level of contact. On the United States’ side, there were still concerns about the pros-
pect of terrorism and Iran’s support of Hamas (BBC News16)). In Iran, the reaction to United 
States’ involvement was complex. While the reform-minded president, his party, and civilians 
viewed the relations positively, the conservative (right) wing, which is strongly supported by 
Supreme Leader Khamenei, criticized it. For example, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, said at Friday 
prayers in Tehran : “[n]aturally America wanted to take advantage of this situation by offering 
some help and bringing up the issue of relations.” (BBC News)17). Many international organi-
zations and NGOs and states contributed by providing donations and cooperating on recovery 
and reconstruction. Amongst them, for instance, the World Bank provided the Iranian govern-
ment with a loan of about US$ 300 million, of which US$ 42 million had to be spent on revitaliz-
ing the city’s economy (IFRCRC, 2004).
The United Nations and its-sub agencies, like UNESCO and UNICEF, were engaged in 
many recovery and reconstruction projects. However, in practice, most of the projects had to 
be carried out through cooperation with the Iranian government. Both sides claimed that their 
efforts were based on the participation of local people, civil society or the NGOs. For example, 
the Iranian Government provided a guidebook of lists of public buildings, like schools and health 
centers to those foreign NGOs that wanted to take part in reconstruction. This was the best 
way to manipulate the allocation of money during reconstruction. In some places, surprisingly, 
this caused the supply to exceed the demand for public buildings, while in other places no new 
buildings were built. Another corresponding problem, which the author observed during field 
survey (2007), was that more than two or three elementary schools were built—just one or two 
streets a way from one another. One local resident in Bam answered that this was because 
some local officials, who were from those places and had influence, made an effort to get recon-
struction projects allocated to their districts.
Soon after the rescue and relief operations, many international and national NGOs were 
forced to leave Bam by the Iranian authorities, although those NGOs concentrated on recovery, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction were supposed to stay for a longer period. The official 
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claimed that the international NGOs as well as the national NGOs had finished their jobs, so 
they had to leave Bam. However, the openness of the social sphere after the disaster along-
side mottos like “participatory reconstruction” provided a unique opportunity for NGOs and 
civil society in Iran. For example, there were many NGOs (particularly in Kerman Province 
and Bam) that were established right in the aftermath of the disaster to help the victims and 
survivors. These are Kerman NGO House, which was set up in 2003 to coordinate local 
NGOs in the Province of Kerman. As stated in Kerman NGO House’s report (2004), there 
have been about one hundred NGOs in the Province of Kerman that engage in various activi-
ties, including education, children’s, women’s and disabled people’s support, and to environ-
mental issues.
The Kerman NGO House itself ushered in requests from NGOs in Bam that were sup-
posed to be sent to national as well as international NGOs. Other active NGOs in Bam were 
those whose headquarters were in Tehran, but they extended their networks nationwide, like 
the Hamyaran NGO Resource Center and the National Youth Organization. These organiza-
tions defined their NGOs as non-profit, non-political and independent institutes and their pur-
pose as empowering people, NGOs and other community-based organizations, yet many of 
these NGOs had little or no experience in disaster work, especially in rescue, evacuations, refu-
gee camp management, or in the preparedness of the local community. They even lost their 
own members and offices in the earthquake in Bam. One such was Nobavaran, a local NGO in 
Bam, which was established to promote education, facilities for children, sports, job training, 
housing support, to publish a local newspaper, and to organize traditional cultural events. A 
few, such as YARA (2004), which specialized in disaster management and was located in Tehran, 
noted that they were not able to provide significant relief assistance, though they arrived soon 
after the disaster. They admitted that this was because of their lack of experience and practice 
(Atsumi and Okano, 2004). Given the Iranian government’s limitations on NGOs activities, 
the main shortcoming felt by national and local NGOs was the lack of long-term thinking by 
international and foreign NGOs in keeping tough with and support for local NGOs. In particu-
lar, when these organizations left the town, many of the facilities that they had provided for chil-
dren, women, for psychological assistance and disabled people went, too. Photo 2 shows aban-
doned sites after the departure of the foreign NGOs.
Other such NGOs, the Society for the Protection of Handicapped Children and Youth 
(SPHCY) and the Society for the Protection and Assistance of Socially Disadvantaged Individu-
als (SPASDI) (in interviews by the author in May 2007) also said that they worked for disabled 
people and especially children in Bam for about several months after the earthquake, but they 
were forced to leave, while many survivors who were severely injured (spinal injuries) were 
still under their care. They had moved their activities to their Kerman branch for children, but 
they were faced with a lack of money and resources due to a loss of contact with foreign NGOs 
that had supported them previously in Bam.
However, there were a few foreign NGOs, like Citizens towards Overseas Disaster Emer-
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gency (CODE), and the Nippon Volunteer Network Active in Disaster (NVNAD) from Japan18), 
who put all their emphasis on support of Iranian local NGOs and their networks as their part-
ners for long term activities from relief to reconstruction. They named their collective mis-
sion, Messages from Kobe (MFK), in order to share their experiences and lessons from Kobe 
with their Iranian counterparts. In their report, the Message from Kobe explained that, while 
acknowledging the limits on foreign NGO operations in Iran—a few of them were in contact 
with local NGOs—they had decided to concentrate on long-term relationships with local NGOs 
as local agents to help and empower the victims of the disaster. They realized importance of 
the contextual background in any disaster operation by foreign and local NGOs, mostly because 
they themselves experienced the Kobe earthquake in 1995. Concretely, they have supported 
those local NGOs that provided child care and job training for women in Bam. Additionally, 
they initiated a picture exhibition by children in Bam and Kobe with the aim of starting a psy-
cho-social interchange and campaign in memory of the victims (Atsumi and Okano, 2004).
From all the above, there is no doubt about the role of NGOs in grounding mobilization and 
the realization of people and civil society (even over the short term) with regard to the claims 
for their rights and the questioning of local and central authorities for their responsibility in the 
failure of rescue and reconstruction in Bam.
6. Renegotiation of human security
6.1. Reconstruction failures symbolize political change
Another stage in the disaster cycle19) that can mark momentum at a critical juncture(s) is 
reconstruction, particularly when the failure of a reconstruction policy is caused by questioning 
the dominant discourse of power and is institutionalized through renegotiation of human secu-
rity (rights claims). In April 2004, the government announced the end of the initial phase of 
Photo 2 Abandoned workshops in the city of Bam.
 Source : Author, May 2007
 These were previously used for tailors and handicrafts, mainly for women who had to work for 
the sake of their families or as the heads of their households.
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emergency rescue and relief. Through the next phase, according to the Article 137 of the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic, President Khatami ordered an urgent meeting to set up 
policies for Bam’s Reconstruction. It was called “The Guiding Office for the Recovery of 
Bam” (GORB)20). There were two major decisions taken. The first was to set up an “Assist-
ing Headquarters” consisting of provinces assisting the task of reconstruction in Bam and its 
rural areas under the direct command of GORB. The second was to give special approval for 
the implementation of the reconstruction plan to the Housing Foundation21). GORB also made 
another related decision, to set up consulting architects, including five of the best architects in 
the country, to review and analyze a comprehensive urban design plan to control the process of 
building construction in the city of Bam.
The Iranian government sanctioned financial assistance, such as grants and loans with low 
interest and long-term repayments, to residents of the city and the rural areas of Bam for hous-
ing and commercial units for repairs and reconstruction per household and unit (Tables 1 and 2). 
All the bank loans should be paid in 12 years at an interest rate of around 5% for the city and 4% 
for rural areas. On average, they paid out US$ 15,556 for the city unit and US$ 6,000 for the 
village unit. According to the UN’s Flash Appeal, the cost of the long-term recovery was esti-
mated at between US$ 700 million and US$ 1 billion (BBC News22)). About US$ 445 million 
Table 1 Government’s financial facilities for reconstruction and repairs : housing in Bam and Bara-
vat (per unit)
Area
Grants  
(million Rial)
Bank loans  
(low interest, million Rial)
Construction Repairs Construction Repairs
The cities of Bam and Baravat 35(3,500)
5
(500)
100
(10,000)
60
(6,000)
Rural areas 15(1,500)
3
(300)
 45
(4,500)
15
(1,500)
Note : Parenthesized figures are in US$.
Source : The Housing Foundation’s office in Bam (1 May 2007).
Table 2 Government’s financial facilities for reconstruction and repairs : commercial units in Bam 
and Baravat (per unit)
Area
Grants  
(million Rial)
Bank loans  
(low interest, million Rial)
Construction Repairs Construction Repairs
The cities of Bam and Baravat 10(1,000)
-
-
60
(6,000)
25
(2,500)
Note : Parenthesized figures are in US$.
Source : The Housing Foundation’s office in Bam (1 May 2007).
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has been spent on reconstruction, and US$ 645 million in loans and grants has been allocated 
through banks. Some 14,000 of 42,000 households have received loans or grants. Another 
US$ 445 million was secured and allocated for 2007 from the country’s National Developmental 
Programme’s core fund (IRIN News23)). The government also ratified some other financial 
facilities for survivors like exemption of their tax debt for those who had lost more than 50% of 
their properties in the disaster areas of Bam by the end of 2003, providing free of interest loans 
for commercial units of around 10 million Rial (US$ 1,000) and bank loans of around 50 million 
Rial (US$ 5,000) and 100 million Rial (US$ 10,000) for productive and technical units, and grant-
ing a respite of two years for repayment on bank loans taken out before the earthquake to survi-
vors in Bam. This does not include loans from the private banks or sector.
After taking charge of the reconstruction of Bam including housing, infrastructure, and 
commercial units, the Housing Foundation announced the main steps to be taken for imple-
menting its plan : first, to remove the debris in the city and its surrounds ; second, reconstruc-
tion of the city in-situ ; third, to prioritize the reconstruction of houses, then the infrastructure 
and commercial units. Its main policy was around three principles : households’ participation 
in rebuilding, maintaining Islamic architecture and the historical identity of the city of Bam, and 
the reinforcement of new houses in line with national earthquake resistant codes. It also 
divided the plan into two parts, i.e. urban and rural areas. To implement the plan, the Housing 
Foundation divided the city into thirteen and the villages into nine sections among the repre-
sentatives of assisting provinces (called as “Assisting Headquarters”) involved in reconstruc-
tion of Bam and rural areas of the provinces. The duties of each assisting province ranged 
from identifying families to providing files for rebuilding, including households, tenants, and 
annex-families24), removing the debris, the codification of all civil and rural places, monitoring, 
and providing engineering consultations and inspectors. The inspectors had to supervise the 
building process and present building designs, based on displays of model building designs in 
exhibition units of the Housing Foundation, and technical services and holding classes for the 
transfer of earthquake resistant building techniques. Architectural assistance and urban plan-
ning were provided through the establishment of the Bam Council of Architecture and Urban 
Development, which consisted of 500 building engineer inspectors.
Nevertheless, bureaucratic procedures have become the main obstacle to progress in the 
reconstruction phase. Households in Bam and Baravat had to follow many steps in order to 
reconstruct their houses, with each step being time-consuming in itself. For instance, people 
had to fill in several application forms and completely clean up the debris of their houses, pro-
vide a cadastral map of their land, choose one of the designs presented to them, approve a 
design sketch, choose a contractor, apply for a loan, which is in installments and has to be paid 
back after the accomplishment of every stage of construction (Housing Foundation, Guidebook, 
2005). People showed the authors the papers that they had to fill in and follow. These fami-
lies said that they followed the official procedures, but they could not receive a loan or other 
facilities. They complained that every time they went to the related office and asked for facili-
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ties and a start to the building, the official presented either more paper work or promised the 
next time he would do so (interviews by the author, May 2007). The author also observed 
many people waited long hours outside the office of a related official to get progress with their 
paperwork, although there was little hope of success. One of them told that “They (the offi-
cial) promised us participation, but in practice, we just became busy running from one office to 
another from morning to night, just to construct our house.”
Above all, households had to start their reconstruction at least two months after receiving 
their certificate. Otherwise, they could not receive their loan. Further, sometimes all these 
attempts slowed down because of officials’ inefficiency. According to the program’s timetable, 
the Housing Foundation set itself the task of reconstruction within 3 years. This was also 
seen as a deadline for people to apply for housing reconstruction or repairs. But, the officials 
were negligent in not making sure that the deadlines were widely known. Then, when the 
time came, the Housing Foundation determined the closure of its main reconstruction phase 
and subsequently, the Housing Foundation’s inspectors, the funding incentives and the grants 
were gone, too. While housing construction has continued in Bam, many prefabricated units 
which offered technical and engineering advice and information (2004-2007) were abandoned.
In celebration of the “end” of the reconstruction, the Housing Foundation announced its 
success at about 96%. However, their claims in the light of the landscape of the city, with all 
the remaining debris, many unfinished buildings or buildings that had not even been started on 
yet, do not seem accurate. Noteworthy, in accordance with data and statistics obtained from 
this organization by the author during a field study in Bam, their own statistics and the above 
mentioned “96%” did not match. For example, in the early estimations, the total number of 
damaged buildings, in the city of Bam, was 12,063, of which 4,951 had completely collapsed, 
1,700 were partially damaged and 5,412 required repairing. In the rural areas, 35,396 housing 
units were destroyed, and 4,402 houses needed to be repaired. The Housing Foundation’s 
data indicate that in the city of Bam 26,447 had confirmed the design on their buildings, and 
21,856 houses had accomplished their reconstruction. Also, 5,942 commercial units had con-
firmed their designs and around 2,632 commercial units had been built. In the rural areas, 
29,272 housing units obtained building licenses and 27,552 were built (Table 3).
Table 3 Official Statistics of Housing and Commercial Units Reconstruction and repairing
Number of units  
with confirmed design 
Number of units  
under reconstruction  
and repairing
Number of  
completed units
Housing units in the city of Bam 26,447 26,406 21,856
Housing units in rural areas of Bam 29,272 28,154 -
Commercial units in the city of Bam 
and Baravat  5,687  5,564  2,632
Source : Housing Foundation, 1 May 2007.
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However, the actual situation indicates slow and low reconstruction. Only around 6% of 
the city’s housing and commerce units were finished completely. This contradicts the figure of 
96% above, which was announced by the Housing Foundation. According to the author’s 
observations, there existed plenty of untouched debris, a lot of houses in stages of drilling for 
and building foundations, concrete foundation or skeletons (steel frames, welding, or construc-
tion in the prefabrication stage). When the author asked Housing Foundation officials about 
such a slow rate of construction, they blamed the municipality for the state of the streets. In 
turn, an official from the municipality blamed the Housing Foundation as well as the central 
government for not providing enough funds (interviews by the author, May 2007).
In sum, the Housing Foundation is making tall claims about its success in undertaking 
reconstruction. The chief officer of the Housing Foundation Assisting Headquarters, in an 
interview by the author, when asked about the slow progress of reconstruction, defended their 
progress and accused people of not being interested in following the procedures of reconstruc-
tion according to the deadline. However, what the people had to say, completely, contradicts 
the claims of the officials. Many people started to rebuild their houses using these loans and 
grants of about US$ 15,000, but it was soon understood that the amount was just enough to 
bring their houses to the concrete foundation stage or at best, to the skeleton steel frame 
stage. In the author’s field observations many people argued that because of the long process 
of the paperwork/bureaucratic procedures to approve the start of construction, when they 
received the loan, inflation had skyrocketed. In particular, the price of materials and other 
goods had more than doubled compared to the time when the amount of their loans was 
decided—given that many were also paid the promised loans late or not at all. As Photo 3 
shows, many structures were unfinished in 2007. Many, like in the photos below, have to wait 
for the next loan to build everything. Photo 3 also indicates that most of the structures 
adopted by the residents were steel-frame.
As mentioned before, the Housing Foundation became committed to delivering building 
structures and city designs according to a number of criteria, such as resistant capability against 
Photo 3 Buildings under construction in Bam.
 Source : Author, May 2007
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future earthquakes, suitability for climatic and environmental situations, cultural familiarity with 
the local people, ease of repair, and construction with locally available expertise and materi-
als. However, the output of their designs and plans ran contrary to these criteria and were 
incompatible with people’s lifestyles and environment.
Before the earthquake, the city of Bam was actually like a big village with agricultural land 
(palm orchards) and garden-houses in its center and also around it. It was characterized by 
clusters of housing related to kin groups. Every household member knew her or his neigh-
bors, and they were related. However, in the “new master plan” of the city by the Iranian 
High Council of Architecture and Urban Planning supported by UNDP, what planners had in 
mind was to use the opportunity of reconstruction to ensure development. This became a 
matter of dispute among land owners, the municipality and the Housing Foundation. The issue 
was mainly the reallocation of land. As a consequence of the earthquake, the demography of 
Bam dramatically changed, most of the boundaries were destroyed, and many land title deeds 
and identity papers were demolished. These resulted in concerns about land ownership dur-
ing the reconstruction (Meskinazarian, 2006). On the one hand, the municipality had to buy 
over 1,200 properties to widen the streets. The price of land, compared to pre-earthquake 
prices, rose and they complained about the lack of enough fund (from the central government) 
for purchasing. On the other hand, new land owners wanted to sell their lands at higher prices 
than suggested by the municipality and the Housing Foundation, but many heirs were not living 
in Bam and were not interested in farming date palm orchards which requires a lot of care and 
attention (see e.g. Asgari et al., 2007). Ultimately, they had to find their customers from out-
side, like investors from Tehran, Isfahan and Kerman. Moreover, ‘Islamic inheritance law allo-
cates land to the relatives of the dead owner regardless of whether or not the heir is local. 
When there is no heir, unclaimed property would revert to the government after a court pro-
ceeding (Meskinazarian, 2006 : 13). This also threatened the livelihoods of those women who 
had lost their husbands in the earthquake. According to the same law, widows cannot inherit 
land or other property of the husband after his death unless their husband mentioned it in his 
will. Consequently, many garden-houses were burned and replaced by modern buildings and 
apartment-style structures. As a result, the Housing Foundation and planners could neither 
build “Bam as a healthy city”25), a “child friendly city”, nor could they even carry out their own 
planned development, so the results were worse than the pre-earthquake situation with regards 
to development (see e.g. Photo 4).
Besides the failure of sustainable development plans, the house designs and their 50 to 80 
square meters size did not suit people’s life-styles or culture, especially in the rural areas. As 
mentioned earlier, customarily the people of Bam used to dwell in a garden-house that included 
a big and large house, on average around 170 square meters (IRIN News)26). For instance, 
people in Bam, as well as in many parts of Iran, customarily hold religious events, weddings and 
other celebrations and ceremonies in their houses. In addition, usually children were living 
with their parents after marriage in the same house or in annexes on the land of their parents. 
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Also, this was their livelihood, which required space to store date products and other crops. As 
mentioned before, because of bureaucratic obstacles and a shortage of building materials, many 
also had to change their temporary shelters into permanent homes. Therefore, many people 
refused to follow the designed model houses, which were around 60 square meters. Photo 5 
shows an example of a newly constructed house (50 to 80 square meters). To avoid the limita-
tion in space, many added the previously temporary shelters as additional rooms to their main 
house.
In another vein, though the planned construction program was based on a “participatory 
approach”, in practice, it became clear that the ensuing policy was a physical approach that 
mainly concentrated on the participation of people in building their own housing, although that 
participation actually ended up with filling out paperwork and carrying out all the procedures 
necessary for housing reconstruction applications. It can be assumed that the actual participa-
tion of people was neglected by the Housing Foundation’s officials and experts as well as the 
government. For instance, people’s choices were limited to standard steel frames or prefabri-
cated units. Gharaati (2008) identified the percentages for each technique were : steel-frame 
Photo 4 Date palm orchards dried out and burnt for buildings.
 Source : Author, May 2007
Photo 5 an example of a new building (in situ, 50 to 80 square meters).
 Source : Author, May 2007
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84.4% of the buildings, concrete-frame 8.5%, prefabricated steel 6.3%, while 0.7% were for 
bearing-walls. It was a “take it or leave it” strategy. Similarly, Horst Indorf, a representative 
for permanent shelter issues from ASB, a German NGO, and Danish People in Aid (DPA), criti-
cized some of the building techniques, like the iron structures that were used in Bam by the 
Housing Foundation. ‘They are,’ he points out ‘very keen on iron structures and you can see a 
lot of them in the city. This is not the right way to construct the city. Iron is moving during 
an earthquake. Most of the structures are secured only in one way and not in another way’ 
(IRIN News)27). This indicates that the long run continuity of the program was not considered 
and wasted effort and money, and even failed in its aim to transfer technology or disseminate 
information. Gharaati (2008) in his field survey observed that many households reverted to 
previous construction styles without employing any earthquake-resistant features in their 
buildings.
Furthermore, people had to choose and work with contractors who were introduced by the 
Housing Foundation to them. In many cases, some of these contractors did not accomplish the 
job they were contracted for. In some other cases people (in interviews and court) complained 
about the disappearance of contractors after they received their money for building construction 
without completing their work. Many of these contractors also did not use local people and 
brought laborers with them from other cities that were cheaper than local labor.
It is also clear that the transfer of techniques and new materials has not been sustainable. 
New materials, which are used to build houses like prefabricated units or steel frame homes, 
were incompatible with the climatic and environment situation. Bam is located near a desert 
and has a desert climate, so it is hot during the day and cold at night. Clay and mud mixed 
with straw is a good natural non-conductor of heat in summer and it keeps the inside warm in 
winter, but one cannot live in the new houses without an air-conditioner the summer and a 
heater or stove for winter. Therefore, transferring new knowledge to replace traditional 
knowledge regardless of whether it is suitable, sustainable or continuous or not, without con-
sidering the cultural and social contexts of a society and introducing new knowledge in a very 
short time, does not guarantee long-term continuity and could not be internalized in the case of 
Bam. As a result, negotiation for changing technical domains, such as seismic resistant build-
ing or transferring its knowledge to local people, seems to have been practiced for a short time 
on a limited scale.
6.2. Government’s social rehabilitation policies : Expansion of social issues
The entire focus of the reconstruction program was on its physical aspects, which mainly 
appeared in housing. In this regard, there was no special planning for social rehabilita-
tion. The responsibility for dealing with all related social care issues and rehabilitation was 
given to the Welfare Department. Hence, the Department concentrated mainly on three 
groups : orphans, women and disabled people. According to this department, the earthquake 
left more than 2,100 children orphans, 2,250 women as heads of their households, and around 
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2,300 disabled (author’s interview with the Chief Officer in the Welfare Department in Bam in 
May 2007). The official social ‘rehabilitation’ for these groups was summarized by paying 
monetary aid to each person or household. The amount differed depending on the situation of 
each vulnerable person. In general, 10 million Rial (US$ 100) was paid to vulnerable women 
like the household head and disabled people, and around 300 to 500 thousand Rial (US$ 30-50) 
to the orphans who live with their relatives. Also, the government was obliged to provide 
facilities for disabled people, especially for those with spinal injuries. However, these allow-
ances were paid just for the short-period of one year (until the first anniversary of earthquake 
in 2004).
The author’s findings from a field survey indicate that there is a sense of negligence and 
mismanagement about the social recovery of these groups. Instead of providing and confirm-
ing their livelihoods and giving them some assistance to manage their lives by themselves, all 
the programs were reduced to cash allowances. Even these were neither sufficient nor con-
tinuous. In interview with many of these people, everyone had a long list of complains about 
the way government treated them, such as not providing them with assistance to help them 
become independent. On the other hand, while the Chief Officer in the Welfare Department in 
Bam accepted those complaints, he also accused the central government of not providing them 
with even approved budget for about 200 billion Rial (US$ 2 million). He pointed out that his 
department had carried out much good assistance in joint projects with international organiza-
tions like UNICEF. In particular, they trained more than 120 social workers, he said. These 
workers’ duties were to visit and check on the situation of the children who had been adopted 
by their relatives. However, this number has now been reduced to 40 social workers, which is 
obviously insufficient. He said that they had the problem of providing assistance to more than 
9,900 socially and physically vulnerable people.
Apart from these budget and assistance problems, there are judicial problems, too. For 
example, according to Islamic civic law, orphans cannot be adopted by foreigners who are not 
Muslims, and even if they are Muslim, they have to follow long procedures to adopt a child. 
According to the law, the priority in the adoption of an orphan child is with their first and second 
relatives. For orphans who did not have any relatives, the government through its Welfare 
Organization’s Orphanages had to be the guardian. In the aftermath of the earthquake, many 
Iranians from outside and inside Iran, and even some foreigners, applied to adopt orphan chil-
dren. However, in the end they gave up because there were lots of bureaucratic-paper work 
and new obstacles put up by the government and the judiciary. In addition, in an Islamic 
regime with a patriarchal legal system, it is very difficult for a woman or widow to be able to 
stand alone by herself. For instance, according to Islamic civic law, women do not have rights 
to land after their husband’s death. Thousands of women who lost their husbands were 
deprived of the chance to receive land and use the family’s assets to rebuild their lives.
The issue is that many of these women who had lost their sole bread earners have to 
struggle to feed their children besides other needs, such as education. A woman who lost her 
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husband in the earthquake and had injured her legs said “I have to work for the sake of my fam-
ily, even with my bad health. If I do not work, my family will go through hunger. It has now 
been one year since I received my last allowance from the Welfare Department.” She has four 
children and lived on her husband’s relative’s land. This situation was even worse for disabled 
people, because some of them had to cope with both their disability and the need to support 
their family. In some interviews, both men and women with spinal injuries or physical disabili-
ties told me that after the international NGOs and national NGOs left, they were almost aban-
doned with no sustainable source of income or provision for their medical needs or facilities. A 
social worker, with regard to many of the international, national and local organizations which 
were active in Bam during those early times, also said “There was no plan to replace those 
international, or domestic organizations with local groups or organizations.” The foreign orga-
nizations had to leave Bam someday, and there was no consideration giving to the question of 
local groups to succeed them.
Other NGOs, who came from other regions, also had to leave to return to their main 
base. For example, in the case of disabled people, like those with spinal cord injuries, some 
foreign NGOs or charities provided medical tools or equipment that could be used at home, but 
after they left Iran, their services were also cut and those who needed their services and who 
always had to stay at home could not receive these services any more. The government’s 
answer to their demands and complaints is that “It was a one year program.” In sum, social 
rehabilitation in its real sense did not take place in the government’s announced reconstruction 
agenda. In practice, even the continuation of the Welfare Department’s normal work became 
difficult.
Another problem arose from the influx of immigrants from other areas into the city. 
Alongside cultural concerns, this brought up many economic and social issues. For instance, 
these emigrants took the opportunity to occupy jobs in housing reconstruction or as factory 
laborers. Many building contractors employed them instead of local people because they were 
satisfied with lower wages.
Workers’ immigration to Bam was first encouraged by the government to make the city 
after the disaster look like an active city full of people, but recently the government has faced 
many problems with an increase in drug trafficking and addiction among survivors, which they 
attributed to the presence of immigrant construction workers in Bam. According to statistics, 
over 50% of men and roughly 15% of women were addicted to injecting opium28) by 2006. This 
has become a major challenge for local authorities to deal with the trade route of drugs from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan to Bam and withdraw the immigrant workers (The Guardian29)). 
These are the most serious social vulnerabilities that the government failed to take into consid-
eration whilst implementing the reconstruction of the city.
Camps and temporary shelters also became a problem after the disaster. The govern-
ment erected several camps with prefabricated shelters of about 18 square meters far from the 
city to settle survivors there. However, almost all the people who had land—according to the 
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statistics, about 81.2% of families owned their land and about 18.8% lived in rented accommoda-
tion prior to the earthquake in 2003 (Ghafori-Ashtiany and Mousavi, 2005)—refused to go there 
and erect their temporary shelters on their land. Many stated that they would not go there 
because of lack of privacy for their family (women and girls) in the camps. Others were wor-
ried about their land being occupied by others. As a result, all that money and effort to set up 
those camps was wasted because of the lack of any cultural or social understanding. One of 
the camps outside the city was abandoned by the government, although people still live 
there. Hygiene and facilities like electric power and water were cut. In another camp, people 
covered their places with a curtain to provide their families with some privacy. A lot of survi-
vors still lived these camps at the time of fieldwork, but they shared the same complaint about 
the government’s order to evacuate from the camp and the shortages with regard to their basic 
needs in the camps, such as water, electricity and toilets, as well as the insecurity, like threats 
from drug gangs. The children’s situation is also critical in these camps. They have limited 
space for play or activities—if they are not forced to work for the sake of their families. Many 
boys around 10 to 15, which the author interviewed, confirmed that they had to leave school to 
earn money for their families.
Those who were mainly tenants prior to the earthquake in Bam were settled in such 
camps. Two or three years after the disaster, when all the passion for the people of Bam had 
cooled down, these camps were also left on their own. Then the government announced the 
closure of the camps and, in 2007, it asked people to evacuate from the camps. However, peo-
ple resisted because they said they did not have anywhere else to go. The government in 
response cut the water and electricity. Most of these people were also too poor to secure even 
their material needs. Many had two or three children who also worked for the sake of the fam-
ily. They also did not receive any sustained help or assistance from the government.
The issues above are just the tip of the iceberg. The failure of reconstruction can be 
assumed to be due to the Iranian government’s mis-management and lack of planning. 
Because the government (and its officials) complained about the lack of fund as an excuse for 
the slow reconstruction, it might here be noteworthy to compare Iran’s GDP (US$ 1,355 billion) 
in 2003 with the amount of damage (US$ 1.5 billion dollars) in Bam after the earthquake again. 
This meant a 1% decrease in Iran’s GDP growth in 2003 (see e.g. IFRCRCS, 2004 ; EERI, 
2004 ; UNDP, 2005, 2006). Financially speaking, then, with the considerable amount of dona-
tions and loans that were provided by international organizations and NGOs and the Iranian 
government’s financial capability, the failure of the reconstruction does not reasonably seem to 
lie with lack of fund. Instead, the problem possibly lies with bureaucratic mis-planning and 
corruption in administrative and official sectors, in addition to many influential and powerful 
organizations who abuse government facilities for private ends or for their organization’s bene-
fit.
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7. Dynamics of historical learning/local knowledge
Doubtless, humans have been exposed to tremendous loss of life and property from natural 
disasters on this planet throughout their history. It is also obvious that they learned how to 
cope with them and adapt strategies by building on the lessons of their ancestors or their own 
experience and knowledge in the face of such extreme events or environments. These skills 
and capacities gradually took the shape of traditions and culture (Blolong, 1996) and provided 
them with readiness, self-reliance and resilience without support from outsiders. Since the 
last century, however, the tide has turned, due to economic growth, demographic change, 
urbanization, political processes and, mainly, development failures. These fast changing condi-
tions put double pressures on local cultures’ coping mechanisms to adapt. In particular, the 
increase, the production, and the reproduction of vulnerability over time had a long-term impact 
on the allocation and distribution of resources among different groups of people (Blaikie et al., 
1994). The pressure was also added by local people continuously exploring how to innovate 
and adapt strategies to reduce the risks they face. In this respect, people’s perceptions of 
disaster and vulnerability are different from other actors (outsiders) like government officials, 
experts and international agencies.
7.1. Heritage components 
The people in Bam, Iran, have had a long history of adaptation and resilience on the edge of 
the desert. The harsh environment and geo-strategic location provided them with a rich cul-
ture of survival. In this sense, the Arg-e-Bam (the Bam Citadel)30), one of the first urban cen-
ters in Iran, presents itself as an emblem of a such traditional culture. The old city of Bam (the 
Citadel) in the northeast of the new city of Bam provides an outstanding model for understand-
ing the traditional Iranian city’s social and cultural relationships. The ancient and Islamic Ira-
nian cities consisted of four areas : the “kohandezh” (citadel), the “shahrestan” (wealthy neigh-
borhood), the “rabaz” (middle-to-working-class neighborhood), and the “roosta” (rural areas 
outside the city itself) (Bastani Parizi, 2002). The “kohandezh” of the old city of Bam contains 
the citadel and the residence of the governor, while the “rabaz” bounds the “shahrestan”. Its 
“roosta” surrounds the walled city to its south, east, and west, and the river borders it to the 
north. The “rabaz,” which comprises seven different neighborhoods, contains the bazaar, the 
Friday Mosque (Masjid-e Jame), a “husseiniyeh” (a Shia place of worship), a public bath, and a 
water storage facility, a synagogue (religious minorities like Jews and Zoroastrians lived in the 
citadel, too) a madrasa for dervishes (a Sufi religious school), a “zorkhaneh” (gymnasium) and 
nearly four hundred houses. The “rabaz” was entered directly from the portal projecting from 
the southern (outermost) defensive wall (Nourbakhsh et al., 1974 ; Bastani Parizi, 2002).
Residential structures in the old Bam can also be categorized into three types according to 
class, space and income. The “rabaz” homes (around 400) had a small yard with two to three 
rooms. These houses were connected to each other. The larger homes of three to four 
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rooms, often with verandas, were for the middle class in the “shahrestan,” and the most luxuri-
ous houses, with more rooms, belonged to the aristocrats. They oriented in different direc-
tions for use in different seasons (winter and summer rooms) of the year. These homes were 
equipped with chimneys, large central courtyards, special wind catchers and a stable for animals 
nearby. There were few such houses in the fortress (Mahallati, 1998 ; Yousofzadeh, 1998).
Another remarkable characteristic of the buildings in the old city comes from a highly 
developed sensibility to environmental design. Wind-towers or wind catchers (badgir) pro-
truded from buildings to catch the wind, directing it into the building interiors. These wind 
catchers were also designed to direct air over water basins, which cleansed and cooled the air 
stream. They functioned like air conditioners in Iran’s hot, desert cities (Yousofzadeh, 1998). 
In general, wind catchers were utilized in different ways according to a building’s function. A 
four-sided wind catcher, which caught winds from each direction in each season, was employed 
for larger, more important buildings. Smaller structures had a single, one-sided wind catcher.
In the nineteenth century, all the gates but the one in the southern wall were closed for 
security reasons (Asadpur Behzadi, 1991). Nevertheless, following an Afghan invasion in 
1722, Bam declined in importance. Then it was abandoned up until 167 years ago (1850), 
when the city was used as an army barracks until 1932 and then abandoned again. In 1953, the 
Iranian authorities began to dedicate teams of architects and historians to restoring the old 
quarter, attracting thousands of visitors (Yousofzadeh, 1998 ; Tayyari, 1999 ; Razavi Nikkhu, 
2003-2004).
The 2003 earthquake in Bam damaged the citadel. The long-standing existence of the 
citadel was understood by many as the sign that the area was never hit by an earthquake prior 
to 2003—but, as seismic records show there were earthquakes in and around region. Inside 
Iran, the adobe housing culture and heritage were condemned by officials and seismic engineers 
as the main reasons for the high level of deaths. They suggested using new building tech-
niques and architecture to strengthen the houses, but some scholars, like Langenbach (2004), 
admired the local knowledge of architecture, which could be used to reinforce buildings against 
earthquakes.
The adobe structures with unfired mud bricks have a history as far back as the beginning 
of civilization in most of the Iranian plateaus. The Bam citadel is an outstanding case of such 
structures that dates back to some 2,500 years ago when the city was founded. Adobe archi-
tecture was the traditional form of construction in Bam and the majority of the older houses 
were constructed in this way (Gharaati, 2008). This system of construction was well adapted 
to the hot climate31) around the central and south-eastern deserts in Iran. Although the con-
struction of adobe structures has seen in decline in most of the urban and even rural areas, 
chiefly because of the development of modern/industrial construction materials and methods 
during the past few decades in Iran, adobe structures are still the dominant architectural form 
and they exist in large numbers in most of the cities and rural areas of Iran, particularly, in his-
torical districts (Manafpour, 2004).
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Two main reasons were identified for the devastation of the adobe structures. First of all, 
the adobe structures that were newly reconstructed in the older, traditional style were of poor 
quality (poor workmanship and a lack of construction know-how) (see e.g. Langenbach, 2004 ; 
Gharaati, 2008). As the findings of several surveys on the causes of the collapse of the adobe 
structures in the settlements of the new city (Bam) showed there was too much sand in the 
cement used in the combined/modern style adobe buildings (see e.g. Ahmadizadeh and Shakib, 
2004 ; Kiyono and Kalantari, 2004), while a number of the adobe structures in the old city (Arg-
e-Bam, the Bam Citadel) survived (Gharaati, 2008). A second reason was that most of the 
structures had suffered from termite activity, which also undermined the structures (Smith and 
Petley, 2009), i.e. there was a lack of maintenance.
Before the earthquake, many people constructed their houses by themselves or used local, 
poorly skilled workmen. Some experts, such as Aboutorabi, state that this was one of the rea-
sons for the destruction of the buildings, new or old, in Bam. As Aboutrabi observed, in Bam 
and other cities in Iran ‘much of the building is done by people putting up their own houses. 
But they cannot afford proper materials and do not use skilled labor’ (BBC News32) ; see e.g. 
Gharaati, 2008). Langenbach (2004) criticized the engineering ‘strength-based’ approach for 
its neglect of a ‘stability-based’ approach, like in the techniques and building knowledge of, for 
instance, the ‘chineh’ mud layer, which gives strength as well as flexibility to buildings against 
earthquakes.
As Langenbach observed that ‘many chineh walls, both ancient and modern, proved to be 
remarkably durable in the earthquake. As one approaches the Arg…these walls are seen to 
have remained standing even when whole houses and multistory steel frame buildings nearby 
collapsed’ (2004 : 11). Then, he suggests some effective findings to be used and avoid con-
demnation of in adobe structures. He points out that‘the potential that adobe buildings have 
for “structural ductility” even though they lack “material ductility.” The structural ductility 
can come from the inherent stability that even the cracked adobe walls can have so long as the 
cracked wall sections remain in place bearing one on another’ (2004 : 13).
Similarly, Horst Indorf, a representative for permanent shelter issues from ASB, a German 
NGO, and Danish People in Aid (DPA), suggested that the best ‘architecture for this area is clay 
bricks, but this means 80 to 90 cm thick walls and a very good insulated roof’. ‘As for the roof, 
a very light weight insulated roof would be the best option, which, in the case of an earthquake, 
wouldn’t harm people even if it were to fall. People here also had very good material, which is 
a mixture of mud and grass that can be used for insulation as well’. He adds that it is also 
important to secure clay walls with nets to make them more resistant to earthquakes’ (IRIN 
News)33). Thus, making a little attempt to revitalize the traditional adobe techniques of build-
ing, it would be more sustainable and economically reasonable for people to carry out their 
repairs and construction with available materials and skills based on their local knowledge of 
construction techniques and expertise.
Nonetheless, it seems that technocrats and officials are very comfortable with new materi-
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als and techniques, and prefer them to exploring and discovering the region’s existing building 
heritage. The enormous citadel was listed by UNESCO in December 2004 as part of the 
World Heritage Site “Bam and its Cultural Landscape”34). Since it is a World Heritage Site, 
several countries are cooperating in its reconstruction. Japan, Italy and France have cooper-
ated from the beginning.
Qanat systems (ancient irrigation systems)35) are another salient component of the people’s 
heritage and an element in the coping strategy of the region and Bam. ‘Qanat is gently sloping 
subterranean tunnels dug far enough into alluvium or water-bearing sedimentary rock to pierce 
the underground water table and penetrate the aquifer beneath’ (English, 1997 : 188). The 
advantage of a qanat is that it provides a sustainable technique for extracting groundwater with-
out exhausting the water stored under the ground. They play an important role in the spread 
of irrigated agriculture and the establishment of sophisticated settlements in dry areas (Water 
history, 2003). In Iran, traditionally, the craft and skill of qanat construction and repairs was a 
hereditary profession. The diggers were called “muqanni”. The muqanni expertise was not 
limited to just one place. They had to travel to where their expertise was required, for 
instance, in cases like damage from flash floods to the qanat or when the water table in a qanat 
tunnel was lowered or even had to be extended deeper into the alluvium (Water history, 2003).
Bam’s beginning is fundamentally linked to the invention and development of the qanat 
system, which has continued to function until the present day. Until the 1950s, qanat provided 
70% of the water supply in Iran. As a result of the spread of modern water supply methods, 
qanat met only 10% of the water demand in Iran in 2000. However, they are still profoundly 
important in Iran’s desert citie (Wulff, 1968). Many qanat and wells provide the city with a 
good water supply, which, combined with the city’s good climate and fertile soil, favored its agri-
cultural development. However, the number of muqanni artisans has decreased due to the 
replacement of deep wells by modern techniques and methods. Before the Bam Earthquake 
on 26 December 2003, there were more than 120 qanats in the Bam region. Of the 65 qanat 
supplying water to Bam’s world-famous date gardens, 25 experienced some local collapse and 
subsequently dried up. The remaining qanat suffered from damage approaching 40 to 50% in 
the form of collapsed access shafts and underground tunnels and the closure of open channels 
because of the collapse of walls and surrounding buildings (Manafpour, 2004).
Damage to qanat systems in Bam had a significant influence on date orchards and any 
related livelihoods and occupations from farming to the packaging of the date products. As a 
consequence, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA36)), many date orchards 
dried up. Especially in the rural areas, people received even less attention than people in the 
city of Bam. In that year (2004), a drought also added to the problem of qanat. As a conse-
quence, in addition to the date trees, many livestock belonging to the rural nomadic tribes per-
ished (Mehr News37)). Date orchards require a lot more watering than other crops and fruit 
trees. While local people perceived the repair of the qanat system as an urgent priority, Ira-
nian officials mainly concentrated on housing construction. This furthered the gap in trust 
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over the application of the government’s reconstruction plan. Many local farmers criticized 
both the planners for their lack of local considerations and the central government for making 
decisions such as this one behind closed doors at the center in a way that did not allow people 
to participate in the planning process, despite their claims in favor of ‘participatory reconstruc-
tion’. This phrase was regarded by survivors as nothing more than a slogan because local peo-
ple were not consulted in the government’s decision-making, which seems to be crucial when 
assessing their ability to cope with disasters in the long-term.
7.2. People’s coping systems and perception about the disaster and reconstruction38)
7.2.1. Traditional systems and livelihood security in Bam
Social texture, particularly kinship support, was another place where there was a discrep-
ancy between people’s perceptions and government planning. Land and relative (tribal) bonds 
can be considered two important components of people’s coping strategies in the city of Bam 
and its rural areas. Traditionally, the residents (the “rabaz”—the working class, and the 
“shahrestan”—the middle class) were moved from the old city of Bam (the citadel) and settled 
in a new city, which had previously been their rural (“roosta”) area and contained their agricul-
tural plots. To continue the relationships with their neighbors and their relatives, the struc-
ture of the streets and alleys in the new city was shaped as related families and relatives often 
shared the same streets and areas—traditionally every one or two alleys with some public 
buildings/facilities or religious places were called “mahalleh.” Usually, every such street or 
alley contained the head of family (like a father, grandfather, or even some other influential per-
son in the family), married children (mainly sons), and religious places like a mosque and a Tek-
kiyeh. The Tekkiyeh is the place for holding the Shia religious festival in Muharram—the first 
month in the Arabic calendar and the month that Hossein, the third Shia Imam, and his family 
were killed in the city of Karbala in Iraq in the seventh century AD. This festival is held annu-
ally and is important for most Iranian Shias. The festival is full of ceremonies and worships 
that seem like drills and practice for groups working and cooperating in social activities. Every 
“mahalleh” has its own festival group(s) and one can recognize some implicit competition 
among them. The festival takes about 3 to 10 days and ends on the tenth day, which is known 
as Ashoura. People from different groups and relatives prepare food, mainly lunch or dinner, 
and distribute it among the people. This all provides people with the capacity for managing 
huge activities and allocating their resources in times of emergency or when they need to 
gather their forces.
According to people interviewed in such “mahalleh”, even after the disaster and the signif-
icant loss of individuals—who participated in the religious festival—the Ashura festival was still 
held on a grand scale, and people, especially the women, provided food for participants on behalf 
of their dead families and relatives, although they themselves were in a hard situation with 
respect to food and other materials. The people interviewed told me that it gave them 
strength and patience to bear the psychological pressure (the loss of their dearest) and to stand 
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on their own feet again after the earthquake.
In the customs of the local people in the city of Bam as well as in the villages, land owner-
ship, and specifically farm land are highly regarded. Selling land is frowned upon. Land own-
ership mainly changed through inheritance or a sale to relatives. In sum, this situation enabled 
local people, who know their neighborhoods, to assist each other in hard times. Notably, this 
factor was more evident in the villages, whose agricultural base secures people’s livelihoods in 
the event of a disaster. In one case, one of the villagers in an interview told the author that for 
the first week after the disaster they did not receive any help from the government. She 
stated that in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, she was trapped under the debris of 
her house while she was asleep, and her neighbors came to rescue her, even though each of 
them had lost family members and friends. She also added that many of the neighbors and rel-
atives also helped in burying the dead. She said that after being rescued with no serious inju-
ries, she provided food such as bread, dates and other dried foods that they had produced.
As discussed earlier, land, self-support and close-knit community structures were the 
sources of people’s coping strategies adapted through a long history of knowledge and experi-
ence in normal situations as well as in disasters, yet it is assumed that the government gave lit-
tle or no consideration to such coping mechanisms and thus produced a reconstruction policy 
unsuited to local demands and exacerbated people’s vulnerability instead of emphasizing the 
people’s local capacities. To take one instance, in the aftermath of the disaster, the govern-
ment, with the assistance of international organizations, provided several camps outside the 
city of Bam (like Maasoumiye Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Sina, Bastami, Vahdat, with an average of more 
than 300 units in each camp, in the east, southeast and southwest of the city). However, as 
pointed earlier, the survivors who owned land refused to move to these camps and erected their 
tents or temporary shelters on their plots (Photo 6). They had their reasons, mostly as men-
tioned above in relation to their traditions and customs. As most of the residents interviewed 
stated, they had grown up in big house-garden style homes with date palms and orange trees in 
their gardens, and their ancestors also dwelled in such houses.
Photo 6 Examples of onsite temporary shelters in the city of Bam
 Source : Author, May 2007
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‘We have never been camp dwellers. Then, after the disaster, the government 
wanted to force us to live in a place that is open to outsiders. The units are so close 
to each other ; there are no walls to protect our privacy and security. And, most 
importantly, we needed to be beside our relatives and neighbors to share our sadness 
and happiness with each other’ (author’s interview with local people in Bam, May 
2007).
One of the local officials in the aftermath of the disaster said :
‘From the first days after the earthquake, the people notified the planners that 
they could not live in camps because these were incompatible with their cultural and 
social characteristics. Yet, neither the planners nor the related officials wanted to 
listen to them’ (author’s interview with a local official in Bam, May 2007).
This example reveals that such misperceptions can result in economic costs as well as cultural 
and social vulnerability. However, local people’s capacities were not limited to their historical 
heritage and local knowledge. Another place where the survivors unfolded their capacities in 
the face of disaster and during the reconstruction was their involvement in social activities that 
were specifically directed toward countering official reconstruction policies.
7.2.2. Social grassroots, local NGOs and civil society : capacity building
To some extent, the aftermath of the earthquake also had a positive impact on the social 
grassroots, on the one hand, and the reinforcement and establishment of NGOs, on the 
other. Many previously marginalized social grassroots and local NGOs found the open ground 
after the disaster gave them an opportunity to address social participation and social prob-
lems. It has been estimated that more than 30 NGOs from Bam and the Kerman Province 
became active immediately after the disaster in the city of Bam. Surprisingly, at this time, 
there were many women NGOs and charities among them, like Banuvan e Bam (Ladies of Bam) 
and Women Network. They mainly concentrated on issues related to women in Bam, such as 
health services, and social and cultural activities. They also succeeded in influencing govern-
ment organizations and ministries like the Ministry of Health and Iranian Handicraft Organiza-
tions, and Bam’s Governor to support the women and their empowerment by, for example, pro-
viding handicraft classes for women who became heads of households after the disaster. 
Moreover, there were other civil societies, such as the Mashiz Charity Organization and the 
Nejat Charity Organization (Asgary et al., 2007).
However, during the course of some interviews, the author found that grassroots women 
were playing an important role in informal social networks that were stronger than organized 
institutions and even NGOs. The neighborhood associations of women are an example of such 
grassroots activity. Such associations, if one can call them so, are rooted in their customs and 
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were a continuation of their normal day to day activities. Their gatherings took places at loca-
tions such as mosques or other religious places, like a shrine or a Tekkiyeh. Photo 7 shows 
women gathering in the mosque and a shrine in the city of Bam.
 As part of their religious practice, they receive information and care about other women or 
neighbors who, financially or psychologically, need their help or support. They come to the 
mosque almost every day and there they can be informed about each other’s issues and make 
attempts to solve them. For example, they help the families whose problems are whether 
they can afford the dowry to marry the daughters, or they participate in taking care of elderly 
women in their neighborhoods. They are also very engaged in rallying—protest on issues 
such as the reconstruction, which was one of their concerns at that time and even now, or 
demanding their rights in social programs. In interviews, some of these women mentioned 
their way of coping with psychological and social problems as coming from their belief in God 
and growing up in a desert city. These provided them with resilience to bear the hardest situ-
ation, like the loss of their loved ones in the disasters, and share their sadness and problems 
with others and support each other. Interestingly, the author observed that women individu-
ally participated more—though they were completely excluded from the government’s ‘partici-
patory plan’—in activities related to reconstruction, such as following the procedural paper trail 
or demanding and notifying people about their rights to facilities donated by foreign NGOs, but 
which they had not received from the officials.
Women typically bear a disproportionate burden in terms of the additional domestic and 
income-generating work that has to be done to ensure survival following a disaster. According 
to the Welfare Department in Bam (2007), the number of women as heads of households and 
providers of livelihoods increased in comparison with the situation before the disaster. Women 
needed to earn income to replace lost resources, such as business equipment, crops and live-
stock, and offset increases in family budget expenditure. While it was not traditionally accept-
able for women to work outside the home before the earthquake, now it is not only acceptable, 
there also appears to be competition among women for jobs (Photo 8). Social grassroots activ-
Photo 7 Women in the mosque and a shrine in the city of Bam.
 Source : Author, June 2007
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ities also occurred in cultural and social associations that were run by the educated, artists and 
cultural people of Bam. Artists, writers, poets and musicians were historically welcomed in 
the city of Bam. Some famous contemporary artists in Iran are from Bam—such as Iraj 
Bastami (a famous musician who died in the earthquake). The city has also fostered many 
educated people, most of whom had left the city, but, after the earthquake, many of them 
returned and helped the city financially or with their expertise, and some even decided to stay 
for a long time and support the people in their recovery.
Their activities ranged from organizing art, painting, calligraphy, and photography/film 
making to writing and poetry classes for the youth and children of the city of Bam. Many 
believed that to rehabilitate survivors, especially the children and the youth, concentrating on 
art and culture was salient. Many of these classes were provided with limited facilities in tem-
porary shelters by the artists themselves with some support from NGOs and governmental 
organizations. They were optimistic about the positive impact of their classes on the youth 
and children. Some of them told to the author that even with a shortage of facilities like space 
(they held their classes in temporary shelters), by and large, they were successful in encourag-
ing the youth to attend their art classes. They found many talented young people among 
them. One artist said that many of the children or youths, when they first came to the classes, 
were suffering from trauma as a result of the disaster. Many of these children had lost one or 
both their parents, or other members of their families, and stated that attending to the art 
classes gave them the power and strength to cope with their psychological issues. It should 
be added that the organizers were worried about the long-term continuation of these programs 
because of financial problems.
Moreover, according to a publisher in Bam, “Haftvad”, many books, poems and paintings 
were published about the disaster experiences of the survivors by such associations to support 
the survivors (Mehr News39)). Many contained the poems, writings and experiences of the 
survivors. As one of the authors of these publications briefly noted, the survivors’ writings 
Photo 8 Self-employed women who sell their local products in a street, downtown, in the city of 
Bam.
 Source : Author, June 2007
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contained their experiences of the earthquake, the hardness of bearing the loss of their loved 
ones, while acknowledging painfully that the occurrence of the earthquake was the divine’s test 
of their belief. Then they learned the hard lesson that had awoken in them and made them 
stronger than before.
“Bam City Council” and the “Community Support for the Development and Reconstruc-
tion of Bam City” are two other civil societies whose activities concretely concentrated on 
observing and supporting reconstruction in Bam. Bam City Council, a newly established insti-
tution, is a result of Khatami’s series of reforms to decentralize authority with the aim of 
improving the governance of local provinces as well as supporting civil society. The members 
of the city council were chosen directly by the citizens, and then the members would choose 
the mayor of the city. Although these reforms at the time raised many challenges for Khata-
mi’s reform-minded wing, this was a considerable step in activating civil society (even though it 
had limitations). Bam City Council was also supposed to participate in the decision-making 
process concerning the reconstruction plan. During the early months after the disaster, the 
City Council was expected to take part in decision-making on the reconstruction and to exer-
cise its legal powers. However, the city council was pushed to the margins by the central 
authorities as well as by organizations such as the Housing Foundation. Subsequently, Bam 
City Council took a critical approach to the process of reconstruction, under pressure from the 
local people whom they represented, and blamed the central government for the slow process 
of reconstruction and the delay in the funds promised (about US$ 7 million) for the reconstruc-
tion of the streets and public facilities (Ettelaat.net News40)). Their efforts have not yet 
achieved successful results.
The “Community Support for the Development and Reconstruction of Bam City” is 
another institution established in the aftermath of the earthquake to support Bam’s reconstruc-
tion and development. According to the community (2005), it consisted of people, experts and 
the educated, of Bam who lost their families or relatives in the earthquake. The major effort 
of the community was a manifesto, released on the second anniversary of the earthquake in 
Bam, which declared the inability and failure of the officials in the reconstruction of the city of 
Bam (Mehr News41))42). They first criticized the very slow process of reconstruction in com-
parison to the amount of money (billions of dollars) the officials had received for reconstructing 
Bam. They reminded them that, according to the official time-table, reconstruction was sup-
posed to have finished by the end of 2006, but it can be said that nothing has been achieved. 
Following this, they complained that government officers tried to portray everything as normal 
in Bam, but people are actually suffering from a minimum amount of security and a lack of pro-
visions to meet their basic needs. They then asked the central government to reform or 
change the organization in charge of the reconstruction after the earthquake.
They also stressed other critical points, like blaming the judiciary for not taking legal 
action to investigate the whole reconstruction process, such as its financial affairs or the exact 
amount of international and national donations received. The community also warned them 
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about loss of public trust incurred because the judiciary had not done enough regarding trans-
parency on these issues. Also, the community persistently cited the Guardian Council of the 
Constitution43) for holding the parliamentary (Majlis) election of Bam in the first year after the 
earthquake, and then canceling the result. They also recommended that the central govern-
ment names 26th December ‘National day of Earthquake’ so that it could serve as an example 
or lesson for making further efforts to prevent such large scale disasters in the future. At the 
end of the manifesto, the community reproached the national media for their silence in report-
ing on and reflecting the people’s problems in Bam, especially about assessing officials’ func-
tions (Mehr News44)).
Although the Community Support for the Development and Reconstruction of Bam City 
did not achieve one hundred per cent of its demands, it succeeded both in putting pressure on 
governmental officials and in increasing local awareness. Their attempts might be considered 
as opening the discourse on renegotiation of human security and claims to people’s rights. To 
take one instance, three years later, the judicial officers in Bam announced the arrest of several 
reconstruction officials for corruption. However, the judicial officers did not mention the 
names of these officials or how much they had taken. They just stated to the media that US$ 5 
million would be returned by the arrested officials, but the next sentence of the judicial officer 
sheds some light on the issue. He stressed that they were threatened by some (powerful indi-
viduals) not to further investigate and follow up on the case. The officer also added that these 
arrested officials, some of whom were from Bam, had just rebuilt the places where they lived 
and had not allocated facilities to other parts of the city (Young Journalists Club, Iran, cited in 
Seemorgh.com45)).
 It is worth noting some other informal activities and strategies that the people practiced in 
Bam. During the field survey, the author observed several individual and social practices that 
can be assumed to be the people’s coping strategies. For instance, almost all the survivors 
visit the cemetery of “Behesht e Zahra” every Thursday. After the disaster, the cemetery 
expanded to more than three times its previous size. The visitors bring flowers, clean and 
wash the graves with water and read the Quran. They also distribute dates or other local/tra-
ditional sweets on behalf of their dead. However, these practices connote a more secular 
meaning in Bam. For instance, the pictures of the dead have been engraved on most of the 
grave-stones, which is not a common practice in Iran. When the author asked about this, the 
people simply said :
‘The earthquake was so sudden, just 12 seconds. Then, we had to bury our dearest 
as soon as we could. Many of us did not have time to see the faces of our loved 
ones. In this way we can see them every time we come here’ (interviews by the 
author, June 2007).
Moreover, the survivors visit other graves and express their condolences with other survi-
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vors and listen to their stories of the event and sometimes cry together. The people inter-
viewed believed that in this way they can bear the pain of loss and be patient. Furthermore, 
for them this seemed a good way to cope with the trauma and psychological disorders after the 
disaster (Photo 9). Some survivors, with a mix of humor and pain, pointed out that ‘the ceme-
tery had made a better recovery than the city and that it had now become like our park and 
bazaar’ (interviews by the author, June 2007). The cemetery had a bazaar at the entrance. 
The people interviewed told the author that those selling are mainly emigrants from other prov-
inces taking advantage of the situation after the disaster in Bam.
The author also identified other coping strategies that were used to circumvent official 
obstacles. For instance, as mentioned earlier, housing reconstruction loans were provided to 
those who owned land on condition that they could receive the loan for next stage only after the 
previous stage of reconstruction had been completed. Many survivors who owned a lot of land 
(such as a house-garden, on average 2,000 square meters) divided their land into two or three 
pieces with independent deeds. They then registered them in the names of their wives or 
children, or even their relatives. In this way they could receive individual loans for every 
piece and, adding all of them up, could afford to build a larger house than was officially allowed, 
although the amount of money they received was still not enough to finish the reconstruction 
completely. They were therefore constantly thinking of new ways to manipulate the sys-
tem. They justified their behavior by saying that when the system manipulates them and does 
not work, they have no choice except to circumvent the system and countenance such manipu-
lation.
Another interesting case was an old woman who came after one year to the Reconstruction 
Headquarters Office in Bam and asked to apply for housing reconstruction, but the official, as 
the author witnessed, told her that the time of application was over according to the reconstruc-
tion plan’s time-table. The old woman, however, told the official that she would not leave the 
office till she could apply for housing reconstruction. Many other clients who saw the wom-
an’s action became encouraged to take part in the little strike. Finally, the official approved her 
Photo 9 The Cemetery of Behest e Zahra in the city of Bam.
 Source : Author, June 2007
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application as well as the others. The author asked the old woman why she had not come 
before the officially announced deadline for applications. She said that she had not known any-
thing about it at all. Nobody had informed her about it. The author asked the official about 
the woman’s claim, and the official admitted that they wrote the time-table in the ‘Guide book’ 
provided by the Reconstruction Headquarters Office and those who came to the office could 
receive the guidebook.
Regarding the theoretical ground of this study, understanding the different perceptions of 
local people and the disaster planners/officials would not be complete without paying some 
attention to the issue of politics. In the case of Bam, the local people were not consulted in 
reconstruction planning, although the government at first advocated a ‘participatory approach’. 
The people had little influence on the government’s decision-making in relation to reconstruc-
tion. This is critical when we want to emphasize the coping capacities of local people in the 
face of disaster mitigation in the long-term.
Considering that many reasons for vulnerability during a disaster have their roots in politi-
cal power relations, assessing people’s strategies with respect to the political context, as well 
as their overall vulnerability, has to be necessary. Therefore, people’s participation should be 
made part of an empowerment process. Joint assessment of capacities and vulnerabilities 
builds awareness.
8. Conclusion
The present work aimed to develop an analytical framework for human security and disas-
ter studies. This was argued and exemplified through the case of the Bam earthquake (2003) 
in Iran. Several questions were raised in this regard. The central question was how human 
insecurity is related to existing power relations and security. In other words, to what extent 
can natural disasters such as earthquakes trigger a renegotiation of human security? 
In order to answer this question, we needed, in particular, to know the outcome of the Ira-
nian government’s planning regarding the changing distribution of power. Was it centralizing 
or decentralizing? Did it help to mitigate the effects of the disaster? How did these practices 
relate to policy outcomes? What is the potential capacity of people, and how did they put pres-
sure on the government and renegotiate their demands or reduce their vulnerability to earth-
quakes in Bam? 
The beliefs were that, although natural disasters, such as earthquakes, undermine human 
society, what causes disaster vulnerability even within a single community is the existing power 
structure. Policy has to be seen as practice that involves theories about policy decisions, types 
of knowledge and administrative skills, and processes of bureaucratization, all of which are 
deeply political. People’s perceptions and capacities with regard to disasters are different from 
those who intervene, such as governments or international and national NGOs. Moreover, 
besides vulnerability to disasters, people have historically, and through their improvisational 
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and long-term efforts, developed coping strategies to mitigate or at least reduce the impacts of 
natural disasters.
The investigation of the present research carried out a theoretical explanation and an 
empirical case study. The theoretical parts began with a review of various definitions and con-
ceptualizations of security studies with the aim of extracting a proper definition that can autho-
rize and empower people to decide about their perceived security contents. At first, the dis-
cussion showed that most security concepts are overwhelmingly obsessed by content of 
security as threats, dangers and risks which are based on ontological viewpoints. By contrast, 
the authorization concept of security was assessed through how the processes of authorization 
or the legitimation of security was undertaken by people through the act of social con-
tract. The authorization concept of security is based on an epistemic viewpoint. This defini-
tion of security was utilized within a framework for the analysis of human security.
With this definition of security as authorization, the present framework, which was adopted 
from Pelling and Dill (2010) with slight modifications, was applied to the present case 
study. The framework is concretely built on a disaster-politic approach which seeks to recog-
nize political impacts on a post-disaster situation. It particularly consisted of four moments 
(Figure1) for the realization of critical junctures or tipping point(s) where a renegotiation of 
human security and the social contract (rights claims and responsibilities) can take place. It is, 
however, acknowledged that the framework is based on heuristic purposes and that critical 
junctures could unfold at any of these moments. In adopting the analytical framework of disas-
ter-politics within a human security approach, the objective was related to the political nature 
of the present case study alongside the proposal of a human security approach that stressed the 
empowerment of people at the grassroots through the social contract and renegotiation of their 
human security.
Applying this framework to the case study of Bam, several findings could be identified. In 
the case of Bam, the mobilization of local people was first shaped during the emergency/
response phase of the disaster. Most of the rescue and relief operations were carried out by 
the local people. This was chiefly recognized as a sign of the inability and mismanagement of 
the central as well as local governments. This brought the local people to a realization of their 
capabilities in the face of such a massive disaster and, at the same time, there was an erosion of 
trust in the government. The people were especially angered by the lack of transparency 
regarding the number of deaths and the exact amount of donations the Iranian government had 
received from international and national organizations and individuals, and the way in which the 
first aid and donations were distributed. With the cooperation of local and foreign NGOs and 
civil society, people mobilized around these issues. They institutionalized a discourse around 
the renegotiation of human security and the social contract with a manifesto of the failure of the 
reconstruction plan adopted by the Housing Foundation (an organization related to influential 
authorities in Iran’s Islamic regime), but local people’s push for political change and the renego-
tiation of their rights (human security) was blocked by the central government.
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The Iranian government planned to adopt a ‘participatory approach’ in the reconstruction 
of the city of Bam. However, after increasing criticism about its functions and capabilities in 
the management of the situation, the government attempted to reduce the reconstruction to 
bureaucratic procedures, and it sent foreign and national NGOs out of the city and the rural 
areas, besides controlling the activities of local NGOs. The Iranian authorities claimed that 
these actions were taken to ensure Islamic ideology (the regime’s political ideology) against 
‘cultural invasions’ that were assumed to be a threat as a result of the danger posed by the pres-
ence of foreign NGOs as well as national NGOs (who were more secular or reform-minded). 
At the present moment, when it comes to assessing this case study, the tipping point can be 
seen to be the repression by the Iranian authorities. However, the author posits that the after-
math of the disaster provided the opportunity to increase people’s realization and capacity to 
renegotiate their rights and human security. It seems to be the case that some of this impact 
needs time to unfold and become clearer.
The main advantage of the present framework, which was adopted from Pelling and Dill 
(2010), is the capability and flexibility of the framework for most case studies that adopt a social 
and political approach. The main shortcoming felt by the author during the survey was that 
little consideration was given to the socio-historical sources behind the coping strategies or 
people’s perceptions concerning disaster vulnerability and mitigation. To modify this frame-
work by giving due weight to the specific situation of the case study, the present research puts 
emphasis on local knowledge and the historical heritage as ways people cope with their vulner-
ability to disaster. The outstanding examples of such heritage and local knowledge (Arg-e-
Bam and the qanat system) were illustrated in Section 7.1. In addition to this historical heri-
tage, the informal institutions and networks of women and people’s relatives were recognized.
In the end, it has to be noted that although the present survey in the case study simplified 
civil society and regarded the people as homogeneous in order to manage the survey more eas-
ily, the actual situation is more complex. For example, local officials also belong to several 
groups within civil society, informal networks, and so on, including campaigns for the decentral-
ization of power and its allocation to local areas, while, on the other hand, they also compete for 
resources and are corrupt. It also needs to be noted that after everything that has been said 
about local knowledge, it is not appropriate to romanticize traditional systems by overlooking 
their weaknesses.
This is an abridged and revised version of the author’s doctoral thesis titled “Human Secu-
rity Approach to Post-Disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction : a Case Study of the 2003 
Bam Earthquake, Iran” submitted to Tohoku University in 2012.
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Note
 1) http://www.jfunu.jp/event/human_security.html
 2) http://unu.edu/publications/articles/natural-disasters-and-human-security.html
 3) The objective sense occurs when there is physical and factual evidence of the existence of threats or 
survival to be measured, while the subjective sense refers to what one feels and cognizes about 
threats and fears. For instance, one can feel (at the time) safe (with no sense of imminent threat) 
without being safe, and likewise one can be free of real threats without believing this to be the case—
subjective constructs and subjective understanding (Booth, 2007). The two senses along with the 
‘absence of threats’ have however raised many debates, too.
 4) Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), was a German political theorist and philosopher of law. Much of his work, 
especially from the Weimar period, remains both influential—particularly for the theoretical 
foundations of realism—and controversial today.
 5) Human security has also been taken up—with varying levels of commitment—by regional 
organizations, including the European Union (EU), the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the African Union, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the League of Arab 
States (LAS) (Human Security Unit, 2009 : 55-58).
 6) For a firsthand explanation of human security, see UN (1994). See also UN (2000b ; 2004 ; 2005.UN 
2000b ; 2004 ; 2005).
 7) A helpful collection of these debates can be found in the series of special issues of Security Dialogue 
30(3) (September 1999) ; 33(4) (December 2002) ; 35(3) (September 2004) ; 39(4) (August 2008).
 8) There are other ministries, organizations, sub-organizations and institutions that are involved in 
disaster management in Iran, for example, the Ministries of Housing and Urban Development, Energy, 
Health, Roads and Transportation, Agriculture, Commerce, and the Environmental Protection 
Organization, the Meteorology Organization, the Forestry and Rangeland Organization, the Planning 
and Budget Organization, the Institute of Geophysics, the Red Crescent Society Army and 
Disciplinary Forces and their parallel, affiliated ‘revolutionary organizations’, which are more powerful 
and hold more authority than the main ministry, such as the Housing Foundation, which is a very 
important and crucial organization for the approval and implementation of reconstruction programs, 
and the Jihad of Agriculture and Construction, Basij. The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia 
founded by order of the Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979.
 9) This lasts 24 to a maximum of 72 hours after an earthquake strikes (Glass, 2001 ; Bahtti, 2005).
10) BBC News. ‘Iran Lowers Bam Earthquake Toll’. 29 March 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/3579173.stm.
11) The Iran and US relationship had been cut since the hostage crisis in 1979, when a group of Islamist 
students and militants took over the American Embassy in Tehran in support of the Iranian 
Revolution. Then, 52 American diplomats were held hostage for 444 days from November 4, 1979, 
to January 20, 1981.
12) BBC News. ‘The Politics of Earthquakes’. 30 Dec. 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/
middle_east/3351121.stm.
13) China Daily. 9 ‘7-year-old quake victim rescued in Iran’. 4 Jan. 2004. http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/en/doc/2004-01/04/content_295549.htm.
14) BBC News. ‘The Politics of Earthquakes’. 30 Dec. 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/
middle_east/3351121.stm.
15) BBC News. ‘Iran Considers Moving Capital’. 5 Jan. 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3368607.
stm.
16) BBC News. ‘The Politics of Earthquakes’. 30 Dec. 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/
middle_east/3351121.stm.
17) BBC News. ‘Iran Rejects US Delegation Plan’. 3 Jan 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
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east/3364345.stm
18) Many other NGOs and research teams were also dispatched from Japan to Bam in the aftermath of the 
disaster, such as : Peace Wings Japan and NICCO (Nippon International Cooperation for Community 
Development) in addition to a research team to help estimate the damage (see e.g. Miyajima, et al., 
2004).
19) This is also famous as the five “R” : response, relief, recovery, reconstruction, and re-preparation 
(Atsumi and Okano, 2004).
20) This consisted of the Ministries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Economic 
and Financial Affairs, Islamic Culture and Guidance, and organizations such as Planning and 
Management, Cultural Heritage and Tourism, the Red Crescent Society, the Housing Foundation, and 
the Governor-General of Kerman Province.
21) The Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolutionary is a revolutionary organization set up in 1979.  
First, it was due to support the construction of houses in the rural areas of Iran. However, this 
organization is now involved in a vast range of activities with regard to construction and planning in 
Iran. The Housing Foundation has also had experience in past post-disaster reconstruction of 
stricken Iranian towns, such as Ghaen in 1981 and Rudbar-manjil in 1991, but the approach in both 
cases was techno-centric and top-down, with no choice for the people (Badri et al., 2006). In case of 
Ghaen, when the city was unfortunately hit by another earthquake 16 years later (1997), more than 
1,500 people lost their lives, apparently, mainly those who were living in the rebuilt houses (see e.g.  
BBC News. ‘Starting from Scratch in Bam’. 2 Jan. 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/3363125.stm. Also see Gharaati, 2008).
22) BBC News. ‘Rebuilding Bam “could cost $1bn” ’. 9 Jan. 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/3383435.stm
23) IRIN News. ‘Iran : Reconstruction Efforts in Quake-Devastated Bam Continue Two Years on’. 26 
Dec 2005. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=25833
24) Annex-families were defined by the Housing Foundation as young couples who were living before the 
earthquake within their parents’ house.
25) A healthy city is one that improves its environment and expands its resources so that people can 
support each other in achieving their highest potential’. This was also one of the city’s urban plans, 
which was encouraged by international organizations like the WTO. UNESCO, and UNDP.
26) IRIN News. ‘Iran : Reconstruction Efforts in Quake-Devastated Bam Continue Two Years on’. 26 
Dec 2005. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=25833
27) IRIN News. ‘IRAN-IRAN : Reconstruction still being debated in Bam’. 26 February 2004. http://
www.irinnews.org/report/23419/iran-iran-reconstruction-still-being-debated-in-bam
28) Opium and the addiction to it were traditionally respectable and widely available in a city like Bam, 
which lies on the drug transit route from Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the significance of the 
current situation is that after the disaster people started to inject opium. This raised concerns about 
an epidemic of HIV/Aids in Bam.
29) The Guardian. ‘After the Earthquake, Bam Battles with Heroin and Aids’. 11 May 2006. http://
www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2006/may/11/iran.naturaldisasters
30) The Citadel is said to date back to the pre-Islamic Achaemenid period (sixth to fourth centuries BC).  
It flourished during the seventh to eleventh centuries AD as an economic and trade center and the 
textiles and cloths of Bam, such as silk and cotton enjoyed universal fame. The city’s location was 
also of great value as it lay at the crossroads of famous routes, particularly ‘the silk road’, which 
brought the treasures of the ancient east to what was Persia, and on to the Mediterranean and the 
fashionable capitals of Europe (Yousofzadeh, 1998).
31) For this reason, most adobe structures are built with a dome or vaulted roof system to make the inside 
of the house cool. Furthermore, the building materials (clay, soil, mud, sand and sometimes straw) 
are all locally available.
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32) BBC News. ‘The Politics of Earthquakes’. 30 Dec. 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/
middle_east/3351121.stm.
33) IRIN News. ‘IRAN-IRAN : Reconstruction still being debated in Bam’. 26 February 2004. http://
www.irinnews.org/report/23419/iran-iran-reconstruction-still-being-debated-in-bam
34) http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1208/
35) About 3,000 years ago, Persians discovered how to construct tunnels that tap groundwater and lead it 
to human settlements and agricultural lands. The technique of using qanat was sufficiently well 
established in the Achaemenid period (sixth-fourth centuries BC). The archaeological discoveries of 
ancient qanat in the south-eastern suburbs of Bam are datable at least to the beginning of the second 
century BC (English, 1997).
36) IRNA. ‘Bam’s Framers : Thirsty Palm gardens require immediate attention’. 7 Feb 2003. www.
irna.ir
37) Mehr News. ‘The People in Rural Areas of Bam Have a Lot of Problems’. 25, December, 2005.  
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=269494
38) This section relies on the author’s observations and interviews with local people during a field survey 
in April, May and June 2007 in the city of Bam and surrounding rural areas—except for where sources 
are noted.
39) Mehr News. ‘Cultural Reconstruction of Bam also Needs people’s support’. 28, December, 
2005. http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=270935
40) Ettelaat.Net News. ‘Bam after Eight Years’. 26 Dec. 2011. http://ettelaat.net/11-december/print.
asp?d=61178
41) Mehr News. ‘The Bam Reconstruction Officials are unable to construct it’. 26, Decmber, 2005.  
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=270033 
42) The society did not explicitly mention the Housing Foundation ; but it was not difficult to guess the 
identity of the institution related to the work of reconstruction that the manifesto was referring to.
43) The Guardian Council of the Constitution (Persian : Shora-ye Negahban-e Qanun-e Assassi), also 
known as the Guardian Council or Council of Guardians, is an appointed and constitutionally-mandated 
12-member council that wields considerable power and influence in the Islamic Republic of Iran (see 
also “Shora-gc.ir”. Shora-gc.ir. Retrieved 6 Aug. 2012. http://www.shora-gc.ir/Portal/Home/)
44) Mehr News. ‘The Bam Reconstruction Officials are unable to construct it’. 26, December, 2005.  
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=270033
45) Seemorgh News. ‘Arresting of Several Bam Reconstruction Officials for Corruption’. 2 July. 
2008. http://www.seemorgh.com/news/2063/8587.html
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